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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Study of Participation
The study of participation is crucial for understanding American democracy, as
participation is at the heart of all democracies (Verba & Nie, 1972). Disagreement over the health
of the American democracy exists: Some scholars have contended that meaningful democratic
participation is on the decline (Brown, 2002; Freelon, 2010), placing American democracy in
critical condition. Other scholars believe the situation is not so dire and that new communication
technologies have created new media for acquiring political information and increasing
enthusiasm, engagement, and eventually political participation (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010;
Towner & Dulio, 2011). These technologies, according to the optimists, will revive the state of
American democracy (Delli Carpini, 2000).
Two narratives have dominated scholarly debate about the role of communication and
political participation (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). One narrative consists of the expectation
that new communication technology will stimulate participation among those who do not vote and
engage with politics (Delli Carpini, 2000). The other narrative flows from the argument that
passive television culture and declining group memberships have created a ‘‘generational
displacement’’ from politics and public life that is unlikely to be ameliorated by new forms of
online civic action (Bennett et al., 2011). These pessimists have predicted that new communication
technologies will occupy voters’ limited time and harm participation rates (Putnam, 2000).
The use of a narrative with only dichotomous options has proven problematic. As Wright
(2012) argued, the perceived binary relationship harms research and hurts political communication
scholarship.
The schism between the revolution and normalization “schools” has negatively
influenced subsequent empirical analyses of political conversation online (and of e-
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democracy studies more generally). It will argue, first, that many scholars have failed to
consider the nature of revolutionary change in any detail, tending to frame and interpret
their research findings with the very technologically determinist accounts of
revolutionary change of which they are so critical: the either/or dichotomization of
revolution/normalization is false. A more nuanced understanding of ‘revolution’ and
“normalization” is required, one that places it in the context of a broader range of
potential impacts, if we are to fairly assess how new media impact politics, and
deliberation in particular. (p. 245)
In response to this perceived deficiency in scholarship, a third camp of scholars has
emerged. This group has contended the relationship between new communication technologies and
participation probability exists in the gray area between the optimists and pessimists (Wright,
2012). These scholars have begun to formulate support for the normalization narrative, in which
new communication technologies become just another tool to reinforce the political interest of
people who are already engaged (Bimber, 2001; Boulianne, 2009; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004).
Disagreement exists among political communication researchers over which of these narratives
most aptly describes the relationship between technology and participation. Optimists have argued
that the introduction of technology can alter the availability of democratic spaces, which could
allow individuals to overcome traditional socioeconomic barriers to participation (Marien, Hooghe,
& Quintelier, 2010). Pessimists will point to the new barriers, such as availability of Internet
access, which limit political engagement in marginalized communities (Kenski & Stroud, 2006;
Marien et al., 2010). Normalists will point to no significant change between content consumption
and political behaviors (Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009). Research therefore must move beyond
simplified narratives to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between individual facets
of communication technology and civic engagement (Boulianne, 2009).
This project is intended to address those concerns by looking at political discourse in
interactive new communication environments. Political communication scholars have
traditionally examined presidential elections and big events, such as the Arab Spring. Enli and
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Moe (2013) called for political communication research to move beyond headlines and to look at
the local races that make up the bulk of the political process. This dissertation study was aimed at
filling in the gaps in knowledge of nonpresidential-related political communication research,
focusing on nonpresidential elections. The goal in this research was to move beyond the big
events to examine political content on the nonpresidential statewide race level in order to
differentiate between the narratives of the optimists, pessimists, and normalists.
Researchers who have investigated political content have developed many theories and
employed different research methods. This study used political information efficacy (PIE) and
functional theory of campaign discourse to guide the selection of stimuli and to conduct a
laboratory experiment to test the effects of exposure to online political advertising on
individuals’ confidence in the political knowledge they possessed.
This project also focused on differentiating the effects of political advertising on those who
were politically engaged and those who were unengaged. The results provide information on
participants’ new media use habits to gain further insight into how those user habits affect
political engagement. Experimental methods have not been employed to test the effectiveness
of different political advertisements coded to functional theory of campaign discourse
(Boulianne, 2009). The study’s specific focus is younger voters who use social media. Through
this new combination of theory and method, this dissertation was intended to add clarity to
understanding the relationship between new communication technologies and political
engagement.
To understand the state of American democracy, a deeper look at the evidence of its
health comprised a good starting point. Conflicting empirical evidence was found when
investigating the state of American democracy. The percentage of eligible Americans who
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vote has decreased since reaching a 20th-century high of 62.8% in 1960 (McDonald, 2013).
While more Americans, in absolute numbers, voted in 2008, only 62.2% of eligible voters
actually voted, which pales in comparison to the all-time high of 81.8% in 1876 (McDonald,
2013). The 2008 election might have been an aberration—the 2012 election produced a 58.7%
voter turnout, continuing the recent downward trend in American engagement (McDonald,
2013). The turnout rate for v oters younger than 30 was similar to 2008, with 50% of 18- to
29-year-olds voting in 2012. Their percentage of overall turnout increase to comprise 19% of all
voters (Pillsbury & Johannesen, 2012).
Election turnout declined between 2008 and 2012, but other options to engage in
political action have emerged. People make more of an effort to contact politicians than at any
time in the past (Dalton, 2006). Putnam (2000) replicated four questions from Verba and Nie
(1972) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), covering general political interest, attending a
rally, working in the community, and protest participation. Putnam (2000) did not find any
statistically significant differences between the 1972 and 2000 results. Despite this, Putnam
(2000) contended that political engagement decreased due to television and other factors of
modern life, such as the rise of women in the workplace, mobility to the suburbs, and decline of
social organizations. This debate is difficult to resolve. Comprehensive high-quality longitudinal
data on the voting patterns of Americans are available, whereas similar data on participation
beyond voting are difficult to obtain (Dalton, 2008). The lack of causal research relating new
communication technologies and political participation clouds the debate on the health of
American democracy. Political communication scholars continue to disagree over the
relationship between participation and the rise of new communication technologies
(Boulianne, 2009).
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Political participation and communication are closely related. Analyzing political
communication and its effects on voters requires understanding the information in the messages
that citizens use to make informed choices. One of the most important choices an individual can
make is casting his or her vote for elected office. In preparing to make that choice, individuals
often consume political advertisements. Increasingly, this consumption has moved to the online
world of on-demand, “ anytime anywhere” media. Individuals’ changing habits regarding
how they consume political content brings into prominence the theories of selective exposure
and polarization and their role in American democracy. These theories are not new, harkening
back to a time before the advent of the Internet.
The study of selective exposure theory extends back to the foundational studies of public
opinion research (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). The study of polarization is not quite as historic, but
goes back about 25 years and encompasses the return of partisan news sources (Bennett & Iyengar,
2008). The theoretical study of polarization focuses on the intensification of partisan attitudes and
partisan media (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). These two theories have different origins, but both require
consideration in the new media environment of 2014. Evidence continues to indicate consumers
are selectively consuming polarized news content in greater numbers than ever before (Bennett &
Iyengar, 2008). This dissertation will provide further analysis into these two theories in the context
of interactive political content consumption.
Media and Democracy
Understanding the history of media effects is important for understanding the media’s
relationship with democracy. Prior to the inception of mass communication, discourse often took
place in public spaces. The historical intent of these public spaces was to function as the town
hall, a place where speech relevant to civic life could take place (Bowers, 2004). The next stage
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in the evolution of public space was the rise of mass media as a factor in the decision-making
process. In the 1940s and 1950s, the mass media began to play a role in the political
communication process, but other factors, such as civic groups, remained significant in the
decision-making process (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). In the early mass communication era,
influences from memberships in a group-based society— such as political parties, churches,
unions, and service organizations— had a greater influence on the political decision-making
process than did the mass media (Putnam, 2000). This concept developed into the theory of
social capital.
Putnam, in Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, first
popularized the definition of social capital (Lee & Lee, 2010). However, Putnam was not the first
to introduce the concept. Coleman (1988) conceptualized the term, paralleling other concepts of
capital, such as financial, physical, and human. Social capital, though, concerns societal relations
among individuals. Putnam added further theoretical development to Coleman’s initial
construction. Putnam (2000) defined social capital as two different types: bonding and bridging.
Bonding social capital is associated with homogenous groups, which include strong ties between
members of ethnic, religious, or ideological groups (Putnam, 2000). The drawback is insularity
and shunning of out-groups and their diverse opinions (Putnam, 2000).
People with bonding social capital have little diversity in their backgrounds, but have
stronger personal connections. Deep family connections do not build trust with other
community members. The groups of early political influence practiced bridging social capital,
which was built across lines of difference, such as gender, race, and ethnicity. Social capital
occurs in social organizations such as unions and community organizations, which bring
people of different backgrounds together and influence political choice and participation (Putnam,
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2000). High levels of social capital are associated with high levels of civic health (Zukin,
Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 2006). In the era of powerful union influence,
politicians interacted with community and party leaders in an effort to generate support (Tolbert
& McNeal, 2003).
In the 1980s and 1990s, the media began to play a more significant role in influencing
political attitudes than did memberships in group-based organizations (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).
This switch established mass media as the dominant political space for many individuals
(Bowers, 2004). The rapid disassociation of individuals from group-based civil society and the
rise in media saturation through the growth of new mass media channels could account for the
increase in media influence in the 1980s and 1990s (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Researchers
have revealed that the media told people what to think about (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and
how to think about it (Entman, 1991). Politicians looking to connect with voters embraced this
rapid change in media effects and turned to mass media to exchange information. The mass
media became the preferred medium for politicians to disseminate information and for
individuals to consume information in the 1980s (Freelon, 2010). In this era, politicians turned
away from leaders and used the mass media to communicate directly with individuals in their
homes (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003).
The emergence of new communication technologies seems to have changed the world of
media effects again. As voters exercise greater choice over both the content and source of their
political information, effects become increasingly difficult to produce or measure in the
aggregate, while creating new challenges for theory and research (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).
New communication technologies, such as social media, have customized, personalized, and
mobilized media consumption for many individuals, especially among 18- to 34-year-olds, with
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over 58% of that demographic carrying smart phones (Nielsen, 2011). In order for a
commercial to reach 80% of the country in 2008, the commercial would have had to have aired on
100 networks, whereas 30 years ago, it would have had to have aired on only three networks
(Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The number of networks needed in 2014 is no doubt even greater.
The fragmentation of media alters the study of communication, and these structural issues
must be accounted for in the study of political communication in the social media era.
Empirical research on political participation and the entirety of the Internet has produced
mixed results (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Pfau, Houston, and Semmler (2005) found increased
use of the Internet did not correlate with increased levels of political participation. On the other
hand, Tolbert and McNeal (2003) found that Internet news consumption had a positive influence
on the likelihood of political participation. The Internet is at least as effective as face- to-face
deliberation for motivating voting behavior (Hooghe, Vissers, Stolle, & Mahéo, 2010). Pasek,
More, and Romer (2009) concluded that those who frequently use the Internet for information
consumption are more likely to engage in civic activities than those who do not use it often. The
varying results of the study of the Internet as a whole provide clues, but no clear models, to explore
the relationship between online activity and offline political actions.
Research has indicated the potential of social media to change the way individuals
communicate about politics (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010. Social and political modernization of
the United States has substantially altered democratic citizenship norms and made online
involvement a standard tool used for participation (Dalton, 2008). This study focused on new
methods of participation in the hope of improving the understanding of the effects of new
communication technologies on American democracy. The generation most affected by new
communication technology is that of the millennials, those 15- to 34-year-old digital natives, who
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grew up with the Internet and are comfortable with new communication technologies such as
social media.
Younger Voters
While the effects of social media use offers potential to influence all voters, it holds the
greatest potential when it comes to young voters (Tedesco, 2011). Researchers studying youth
political activity have tried to find connections between participation and changing factors of
society. Younger citizens are less likely to participate in formal institutionalized activities, such as
voting, than are their older counterparts (Putnam, 2000). Television and Internet use have been
blamed for the decreasing levels of engagement of younger voters (Putnam, 2000). Kaid,
McKinney, and Tedesco (2007), noted a feature of the younger generation: “Low levels of
electoral participation may be conjoined with another distressing characteristic of young citizens:
their sometimes shockingly low levels of political knowledge and information” (p.1094).
Putnam’s (2000) forecast was gloomy: “Well-established life cycle patterns give little reason to
expect that the youngest generation ever will come to match their grandparents’ levels of civic
engagement” (p. 254).
Other scholars have placed themselves in the optimistic camp, offering hope that new
communication technologies can stimulate interest in politics and encourage political
engagement. In a meta-analysis of Internet use and engagement, Boulianne (2009) found that the
effects of Internet use on political engagement may be changing over time. Dalton (2009) argued
that young voters participate in many more ways than Putnam (2000) acknowledged. Gil de
Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, and Shah (2010) , in disagreeing with Putnam (2000), stated, “The ease
of use of the Internet, as well as its potential anonymity, may allow those disengaged from
conventional politics to begin to close this gap and allow for a more democratically equal
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society” (p. 46). Indeed, due to the changing education and social landscape, youth are
empowered and engaged with each other more than ever before (Dalton, 2009).
Further youth-focused online studies would help scholars to understand how closely youth
political communication resembles adult political communication (Freelon, 2010). There is little
question that by conventional measures, young adults are more disengaged from politics than are
their older counterparts (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). Youth are less likely to participate in
politics in conventional measures, such as voting, contributing money, volunteering time, or
showing up to a protest rally, than are older Americans (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). The
media habits of youth are also different from those of older citizens, with a preference for digital
content, as opposed to newspapers, radio, or television news (Bachmann, Kaufhold, Lewis, & Gil
de Zúñiga, 2010). Due partially to the rapid evolution of the Internet, it has been difficult to assess
the way in which youth use social networks to engage in politics (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010).
This dissertation study focused on different facets of youth political communication to further the
understanding of the relationship between new communication technologies and political
participation.
Technology and Democracy Narratives
Scholars have worried about the negative effects produced by new communication
technology. Social media is a highly individualistic medium, of which users can choose to
consume only agreeable content (Garrett, 2009a). The very nature of the Internet and social media
encourage the construction of narrowly focused communities of like-minded individuals (Bowers,
2004). These narrowly focused communities could result in homogeneous thought and stifle
debate, thereby negatively affecting civic engagement (Baek, Wojcieszak, & Delli Carpini, 2012).
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Pessimists of communication technology have expected these facts to have a harmful effect on
political engagement.
Research has contradicted the skeptics, with communication technology having, at worst, a
neutral relationship or, at best, a positive relationship with political engagement (Boulianne, 2011).
Optimists believe communication technology will be part of the solution to reverse declining rates
of democratic participation (Bowers, 2004). Optimists see hope in communication technologies, as
these technologies facilitate the way voters gather information, discuss politics, and perform other
foundational elements of citizenship (Dalton, 2009).
New media consumption is a different experience than traditional media consumption.
Online consumption requires continued attention, clicking, scrolling, and searching (Boulianne,
2011). Consumption of digital media has been demonstrated to have a stimulatory effect on voting
habits of younger individuals (Bachmann et al., 2010). The media landscape of the 21st century
represents an important transformational era of political communication, where consumers have a
broader range of information available (Dylko & McCluskey, 2012).The interactivity, mobility,
and ability to create communities offered by current media technologies have been thought to hold
the potential to stimulate participation (Bowers, 2004). Gatekeepers are not filtering out the
opinions presented in user-generated content (Dylko & McCluskey, 2012). The optimists hope
that, especially among traditionally underrepresented groups such as young and minority voters,
new communication technologies can encourage participation (Dalton, 2006). The rise in usergenerated content marks a historical shift in the role of individuals in societal political participation
(Dylko & McCluskey, 2012).
On the other hand, some scholars believe the new communication technology will serve as
just another medium for the politically interested to engage with each other. These scholars expect
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the Internet to become normalized into society and that its use will be confined to those who are
already engaged (Zukin et al., 2006). Researchers have found that White, educated, older males are
the most frequent contributors to online political discourse, the same demographic that consistently
votes (Baek et al., 2012).
This study had a specific focus on youth voters, or digital natives—those individuals who
have grown up with the Internet as an integral aspect of their life. The rise of mobile
communication technologies has enabled digital natives to stay connected no matter where they go.
Many pessimists have argued the current generation of digital natives is distracted, and their low
participation rate is harming the American democracy (Putnam, 2000). This study was designed to
test the effects of new communication technology use on digital natives’ levels of political
confidence. This study used political information efficacy (PIE) as the theory to explain if digital
natives vote. According to PIE theory, the higher level of confidence youth have in their political
knowledge, the higher the likelihood they will vote (Kaid et al., 2007). Political confidence has
been identified as the key component in whether individuals exercise their right to vote (Tedesco,
2011). By showing digital natives different types of political content using different levels of
interactivity and gathering their confidence after each exposure, this research was designed to
illuminate the relationship between digital natives’ media exposure and political participation. In
this study, I investigated the three narratives, which describe the relationship between new
communication technologies and political participation. I research additional constructs, as part of
an examination of the relationship between new communication technologies and political
engagement.
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Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the study, addresses the
current debate about political communication, and delineates the significance of the research.
Chapter 2 focuses on the political side of political communication, including the literature
surrounding the concepts of citizenship and participation. In this chapter, the narratives
surrounding the collision between technology and political engagement are explored. The chapter
concludes with an examination of the variables connecting political communication and political
engagement.
Chapter 3 details the theoretical foundation of media effects and the communication side
of the study of political communication. The theoretical foundation of social media study and
the functional theory of campaign discourse are reviewed, as well as previous studies that
centered on political communication in the examination of social media. Chapter 3 concludes
with hypotheses and research questions derived from the literature. Chapter 4 outlines the
methodology guiding the study, including the procedure, sample, unit of analysis, stimuli,
statistical analyses, and reliability used in this study. Chapter 5 focuses on the characteristics of
the participants, presents the results for the hypotheses and research question, and provides
results of hypotheses and research questions developed post hoc. Chapter 6 presents a
discussion of the results and their fit into the literature. The chapter also outlines the study’s
limitations and presents suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Although many elements of political communication and political participation overlap,
they are fundamentally different concepts. Informed participation is impossible without
communication, but communication is possible without participation, according to some views
(McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007). In this chapter, the literature covering those components of
political communication studies, as well as the concepts that underlie political communication
and democratic participation, is analyzed. Many political communication scholars have
studied the effects of the Internet on civic engagement, political efficacy, and political campaigns
(Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2009). In this chapter, those constructs are reviewed and
political information efficacy, which has been developed as a theory to describe youth voting
behavior (Tedesco, 2011) is considered. The literature review begins with the concept of political
participation.
Political Participation
Political participation is broadly considered essential for a healthy democracy (Verba et
al., 1995). The primary conduit for political information is media, both traditional and new
(Taneja, Webster, Malthouse, & Ksiazek, 2012). Not surprisingly, political communication
scholars have been analyzing the relationship between participation and media for over 50
years (Hoffman, 2011). In the history of the discipline, scholars have examined, identified,
and defined media effects, as well as refined measurement and operationalized key constructs in
the political communication field. The deficiency identified in much of this research on political
communication and political participation was that researchers had not consistently defined these
two activities, especially when it came to studies of new communication technologies (Hoffman,
2011). Most scholars have focused on discussing communication and participation and the media
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effects on these concepts (Xenos & Moy, 2007), but have not precisely distinguished
between the two activities in an era of new media (Hoffman, 2011).
This disagreement or failure to distinguish between the two concepts was revealed in
the research concerning the effects of Internet use on political participation, which resulted in
little consensus from the academic community (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). Research has
yielded positive and negative correlations between the two, and disagreement regarding the
effects of the Internet on political engagement continues (Boulianne, 2009). One reason
researchers have offered conflicting results is the variety of definitions used to describe political
participation (Hoffman, 2011). The classic political communication researchers, such as Verba et
al. (1995), helped establish the fact that attitudes toward political participation are related to
actual behavior, and that scholars need to study political communication because of this potential
influence on attitudes (Gastil & Xenos, 2010). Verba et al. (1995defined political participation
as any “activity that is intended to or has the consequence of affecting, either directly or
indirectly, government action” (p. 9). Conway (2000, p. 3) developed a similar definition:
“those activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of
government officials, or the policies of government.” These definitions imply that participation is
active and intended to influence.
The Verba et al. (1995) definition of political participation accounts only for explicitly
information-rich statements or preferences sent directly to policymakers. The diffusion of
communication channels in the current media era does not allow the easy application of this
definition (Hoffman, 2011). On the other hand, Conway (2000) provided a definition for
“passive” forms of political participation, such as consuming political media. According to the
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Verba et al. (1995) definition, this may not be participation, but may be better defined as
communication.
Political communication allows voters to communicate with each other and the
government; constituents who partake in political participation have a clear intention to influence
government action (Hoffman, 2011). Given that participation is, by definition, an active behavior
with intent to influence government or public officials, how do new forms of online behaviors fit
the traditional definition? One important aspect of participation outlined by Verba et al. (1995) is
that participatory activities are inherently “information-rich acts.” Verba et al. (1995, p. 221)
defined information-rich acts as “those in which an explicit message can be sent to
policymakers.” However, messages not meant for policymakers can also constitute democratic
participation. Denton Jr. and Kuypers (2007) further specified that political communication is a
“public discussion” about revenues, sanctions, and social meaning that can occur in intrapersonal,
interpersonal, small group, and mass communication processes. Political communication is not a
new development; rather, such contact between a government and its citizens has existed for
centuries. In other words, it has developed into a system involving multiple actors instead of
just a direct link between citizens and their government (Hoffman, 2011).
Similar to the lack of differentiation between political communication and political
participation is the lack of differentiation between the types of participation in which individuals
are engaging. The literature regarding political communication has a rich history of empirical
measures of engagement, but lacks depth. Political communication studies should account for the
difference between two types of participation: institutionalized and noninstitutionalized.
Institutionalized forms of participation include voting, joining a political party, participating in
political action groups, and attending organized political rallies (Marien et al., 2010; Mwesige,
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2009). Noninstitutionalized forms of political engagement consist of alternate ways of civic
engagement, such as volunteering, engaging in deliberative discourse, and participating in other
community activities (Marien et al., 2010; Mberia & Ndavula, 2012).
The study of institutional participation has a rich history, due to the vast amounts of
empirical information available (Dalton, 2008). On the other hand, noninstitutionalized
participation does not have a significant body of research in the social science tradition.
Noninstitutionalized forms of engagement historically have not been analyzed due to the difficulty
in quantifying variables such as participation (Dalton, 2008). Institutionalized forms of
participation are deteriorating in America as voting rates, party membership, and other measures of
participation are on the decline (McNair et al., 2002). However, Marien et al. (2010) contended
that noninstitutionalized forms are on the rise in liberal democracies and need to be reviewed in
any analysis of democratic participation.
Most empirical studies on political participation have tended to focus on institutionalized
forms of participation (Mwesige, 2009). In spite of this, focusing on institutionalized participation
alone does not provide a full picture of democratic participation. The potential for democracy does
not end at the voting booth; opinions must be formed somewhere. Democratic participation is often
overlooked in the workplace and everyday life (Brown, 2002). It is in the day-to-day world of
work, entertainment, conversing with neighbors, and ordinary conversations that political attitudes
and collective judgments are formed (Brown, 2002; Mwesige, 2009). Democracy is not simply
about the freedom to vote; it is about making informed choices (Mwesige, 2009).
The evolution of new communication technologies has stretched the traditional boundaries
between political communication and participation, as well as between noninstitutionalized and
institutionalized participation. These new technologies have blurred the lines that historically

18
separated these conceptually different actions. The conceptualization of the dimensions of online
political participation needs further exploration (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010). To further advance the
field, a definition that accounts for both types of participation must be established. Hoffman (2011)
updated the definition of online participation first developed by Verba et al. (1995) to read, “an
information-rich activity that utilizes new media technology and is intended to affect, either
directly or indirectly, policy-makers, candidates, or public officials” (p. 220). Given the conflicting
evidence of the collision of surrounding communication technology and political participation, this
might suggest that, if scholars were to differentiate consistently between online participation and
communication, less conflict might be seen among the various findings (Hoffman, 2011).
This study used active information-rich online political communication media to test the
effect these have on individuals and their intent to engage with public officials and their
community in both noninstitutionalized and institutionalized capacities. In this study,
institutionalized participation in the form of voting and voting-related behaviors was examined.
Noninstitutionalized effects were examined by investigating the individual’s potential to discuss
politics, interact with political content, take action within his or her community, and establish
norms of 21st-century citizenship. Noninstitutionalized participation has changed in its norms
over the years. Understanding this evolution of the concept of citizenship and how American
citizens are expected to engage is a crucial step to understanding the relationship between new
communication technologies and participation.
Citizenship
In this study, the narratives of the technology and American democracy were examined in
the context of the changing norms of citizenship, with a focus on digital natives. While the term
millennials is used to describe the generation that has grown up in the 21st century, digital natives
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is a more appropriate term for this generation. Digital natives, born after 1980, have grown up with
networked technology and have access and knowledge to use the technology (Palfrey & Gasser,
2008).
Among digital natives, the norms of citizenship have changed over the last 20 years
(Dalton, 2009). The optimistic and pessimistic narratives have dominated the debate over the
relationship between new communication technologies and political participation of digital
natives (Bennett et al., 2011), most of the studies analyzing these narratives have failed to
account for the changing norms of citizenship. Without accounting for these changes, many
previous researchers have concluded that participation among youth is on the decline (Utz,
2009). This study accounted for these differences in citizenship norms, in that long-term
conclusions about the status of American citizenship could be drawn (Dalton, 2009).
Another notable facet of digital natives’ behavior is the blending of their offline and
online lives. Most major activities in their lives, social interactions, friendships, and civic
activities are mediated through communication technologies (Palfrey & Gasser, 2008). With a
lifetime of using technology to conduct their lives, digital natives do not differentiate between
online and offline interactions, which causes difficulties when applying traditional norms of
citizenship (Bennett et al., 2011).
The difficulty of interpreting what it means to be a citizen and how one can engage
politically may account for the current controversies over what counts as youth political
engagement (Bennett et al., 2011). Political communication researchers have often failed to
account for the difference between participation and communication, and the same is true of
citizenship. Bennett et al. (2011) argued that the same refinement of citizenship is necessary to
move the field forward, stating, “without a more systematic model of how different conceptions of
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citizenship and engagement become coded into civic communication technologies, it will remain
difficult to make rigorous comparisons and interpret differences across the spectrum of online
communities” (p. 838). Dalton (2008) contended that there are two variations of citizenship: (a)
duty-based citizenship, which focuses solely on voting; and (b) engaged citizenship, which focuses
on other norms of participation in society, such as obeying laws, supporting fellow citizens, and
forming independent opinions. The pessimists who feel new communication technologies are
harming American democracy have pointed to the decreasing number of citizens who participate in
their duty-based activities. Dalton (2006) concluded those pessimists were not accounting for the
change in citizenship norms. Younger citizens are finding new ways to participate in political
action. They are becoming engaged citizens, and empirical evidence is needed to understand how
they are engaging in noninstitutionalized activities. The new repertoire of communication
technology allows individuals to participate in activities that matter to them. Individuals can use
communication tools to contact their representatives or to participate in protests and boycotts,
either online or in person, as the option to participate in activities they find rewarding are available
to all (Dalton, 2009).
Younger citizens have shown a preference for engaged citizenship, whereas older
Americans prefer duty-based citizenship (Dalton, 2009; McLeod & Shah, 2009). In specifically
focusing on younger voters, Lariscy, Tinkham, and Sweetser (2011) found that 18- to 38-yearolds view political participation differently than do previous generations; for this group, more
solitary activities, such as searching for political information or reading blog content, constitute
political participation. Bennett et al. (2011) also argued for a new type of citizenship among
youth, which he called “actualizing” citizenship (p. 839). While the elements of this definition
vary from the definition of engagement-based citizenship, the two definitions share
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foundational principles. Both types of citizens prefer effective action in referendums and
direct action to traditional measures of participation (Dalton, 2008).
Actualizing citizenship marks a generational shift from authority power structures, toward
a personal decision-making influence by peer networks and the use of these networks to engage
civically (Bennett et al., 2011). Dalton (2008) offered a similar view of the change in citizen
norms, stating:
Rising levels of education, changing generational experiences and other social forces
are decreasing respect for authority and traditional forms of allegiance as represented in
duty- based citizenship. Simultaneously, these same forces are increasing selfexpressive values as well as the ability and desire to participate more directly in
the decisions affecting one’s life. (p. 81-82)
The shifts in the norms of young citizens should be reflected in measures of citizenship. The
generational shifts of values are central constructs seldom found in the literature examining
digital natives and political participation.
Simply analyzing voter turnout provides inconclusive evidence regarding the collision of
technology and democracy. A lack of high-quality empirical evidence accounting for the
transformation of citizenship norms prevents researchers from drawing conclusions about the
relationship between communication technology and democratic participation (Dalton, 2008).
With all the conflicting evidence and conflicting narratives, both forms of citizenship need
empirical analysis. Thus, for this study, citizenship norms provided a framework for
understanding how and why the patterns of political participation may be changing. The new
type of citizenship places citizens in a position to exert greater influence over political activity.
Understanding the citizenship norms of digital natives would offer a key understanding of
their rates of political participation.
While the changing norms of citizenship may be changing to account for participation
levels of youth, that alone does not explain the relationship between youth participation and
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technology (Dalton, 2008). Kaid et al. (2007) developed a theory to explain this relationship by
analyzing confidence as the key connection between youth and political participation.
Political Information Efficacy
Self-efficacy is a foundational concept that plays a large role in the link between
behavior and attitude (Gastil & Xenos, 2010; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Political participation
depends on one’s confidence in one’s knowledge (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). In order to
understand the behavior of participation, understanding young citizens’ democratic attitudes is
crucial (McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007). Gastil and Xenos (2010) stated:
In addition to complementing political efficacy with civic attitudes, we look beyond
voting and more traditional conceptions of political participation to consider a broader set
of civic counterparts. As communication scholars, we have particular interest in looking
at the wider range of ways in which we communicate in politics and community life.
(p. 324)
The need for a theory modeling concepts beyond political participation that account for selfefficacy among digital natives was established.
The development of a theory resulted from focus group research consisting of young
voters, who indicated two necessary elements in the decision to vote: information and
confidence in one’s knowledge (Tedesco, 2011). The concepts were developed into the
construct of the theory of political information efficacy (PIE), which “focuses solely on the
voter’s confidence in his or her own political knowledge and its sufficiency to engage the
political process (to vote)” (Kaid et al., 2007, p. 1096). PIE was developed with a goal to study
perceptions of youth voters, who cite the lack of information about candidates and political issues
as the single most important reason for not voting (Tedesco, 2007).
Whereas traditional political efficacy has been defined as an individual’s feeling that he
or she has the ability to influence the political process, the concept of PIE is an internally-based
measure that starts with the political knowledge individuals possess (McKinney &
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Chattopadhyay, 2007). The development of PIE stems from a decade of research on youth
voting behavior (McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007). Focus groups that led to the development
of PIE were conducted throughout the United States. The focus groups performed during the
1996, 2000, and 2004 presidential elections provided explanations about what facts lead digital
natives to vote (McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007).
The development of the internal measure of confidence provided evidence of a
significant construct explaining the participation of digital natives. The most prominent
explanation by nonvoting young citizens was that they lacked the knowledge necessary in order
to feel confident to exercise their right to vote (Tedesco, 2011). PIE, as defined by Tedesco
(2011), has been operationalized through a four-question index. Participants were asked to
state their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale in response to the following questions:
(a) “I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics”; (b) “I think that I am better
informed about politics and government than most people”; (c) “I feel that I have a pretty good
understanding of the important political issues facing our country”; and (d) “If a friend asked me
about the presidential election, I feel I would have enough information to help my friend figure
out who to vote for” (Tedesco, 2011).
Researchers who examined self-efficacy have often treated it as a fixed, given
precondition and ignored the possibility it could be increased (Beaumont, 2011). Other
researchers have treated it as a malleable feeling and analyzed the ability of information to
increase levels of self-confidence. Chaffee (1978) found that consumption of presidential debates
has a positive correlation with voter turnout. Pfau et al. (2005) found that viewings of election
debate promoted positive outcomes and increased self-confidence. Other researchers have
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found that self-confidence and PIE increased when young citizens were exposed to political
information (McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007).
Kaid et al. (2007) found a correlation between the likelihood people would vote and their
confidence in their political knowledge. Other scholars have also found that PIE was a
significant predictor of institutionalized political participation (McKinney & Rill, 2009; Towner
& Dulio, 2011). Kaid et al. (2007) found that younger voters were much less confident in
their levels of political knowledge than were their older counterparts. If young voters do not have
confidence in their political knowledge, they are less likely to vote. How a young voter
processes information and perceives his or her PIE is an important variable in understanding the
likelihood someone will vote (Kaid et al., 2007).
PIE has been used in the study of advertisements and new communication technologies
(Tedesco, 2011). Many of these studies are limited to presidential elections. These studies resulted
from a single presidential election, and even though these studies demonstrated a positive
relationship from exposure to political information and an increase in confidence, further analysis
is necessary to study PIE across a multitude of situations (Tedesco, 2011). The emergence of PIE
provides another construct to explain the relationship between new media technology and political
participation.
Narratives of Participation and Technology
The relationship between communication technology and participation has divided
scholars. Some scholars have expressed optimism that the Internet could offer citizens new
political uses and rewards, primarily because of the Internet’s structural opportunities, such as
inherent interactivity; generally low cost; freedom from boundaries; high speed; and lateral,
horizontal, and nonhierarchical modes of communication that could enhance democracy
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(Zukin et al., 2006). Other scholars have been skeptical of the Internet’s ability to
reinvigorate civic engagement, expressing the belief that the Internet would have little effect on
politics or support (Kaid et al., 2009). The third narrative has coalesced around a
normalization structure, which is based on an assumption that those who are already engaged
in political expression use technology to expand the space available to them to express their
political opinions (Bimber, 2001).
In an effort to resolve this debate, two approaches have been used to examine how citizens
use media for political participation (Pfau et al., 2005). One approach is the macro- level approach,
looking at media in their entirety. The macro approach to the study of communication and
participation began with looking at television as a whole. Researchers have found that increased
television consumption is associated with reduced levels of political participation (Putnam, 2000).
However, television alone is not to blame for a reduction in political participation. The increase in
two-career families and a transition to a suburban lifestyle have affected levels of citizen
engagement (Putnam, 2000). The transition to two-career families has occurred over the last 30
years as millions of American women have moved out of the home into paid employment
(Putnam, 1995). The effects of this shift in the American way of life have had a profound effect on
social capital building organizations. Social capital building organizations bring people together
across lines of differences and build social capital, which encourages political participation.
Putnam (1995) offers one explanation of the societal change.
The sharpest decline in women's civic participation seems to have come in the 1970s;
membership in such “women’s” organizations (PTA, the League of Women Voters, the
Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the Red Cross) as these has been virtually halved
since the late 1960s. By contrast, most of the decline in participation in men’s
organizations occurred about ten years later; the total decline to date has been
approximately 25 percent for the typical organization. On the other hand, the survey data
imply that the aggregate declines for men are virtually as great as those for women. It is
logically possible, of course, that the male declines might represent the knock-on effect
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of women's liberation, as dishwashing crowded out the lodge, but time-budget studies
suggest that most husbands of working wives have assumed only a minor part of the
housework. In short, something besides the women's revolution seems to lie behind the
erosion of social capital. (p. 8)
If the rise of two-career families is not to blame, other facets of American life must be
examined. In the examination of other factors, some place the majority of the blame on television,
as it has become the preferred leisure activity of the American public (Putnam, 2000). Analyzing
participation through the civic volunteerism model, one realizes that time is required for political
participation (Verba et al., 1995), and if Americans’ limited leisure time is spent watching
television, participation will likely suffer. Expanding on the notion of time as a limited resource,
Putnam (2000) offered the time displacement hypothesis, which holds that every hour of television
has a negative impact on political engagement. Researchers have examined specific parts of
television in the second major phase of research into television and political participation. The
number of studies examining microelements of the medium has been steadily increasing.
Researchers studying the micro level have examined individual parts of media content,
such as television news (Pfau et al., 2005). Additional researchers have found that television
news consumption has positively affected political participation (Boulianne, 2011; Nisbet &
Scheufele, 2004). Other researchers have found support for the normalization narrative,
identifying a neutral relationship between television news consumption and civic engagement
(McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999). The study of television on both the macro and micro
levels is an important aspect of political communication research. The dominance of television
requires further analysis of its effect on political participation. This dissertation study, however,
focused on new communication technology, specifically on the rise of mobile social media. The
study of these new technologies began with the assessment of the tethered Internet on the macro
level.
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The history of empirical research on political participation and the Internet as a single
entity have shown mixed results (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Pfau et al. (2005) found the use of
the Internet did not correlate with increased levels of participation. Other researchers found a
neutral relationship between participation and use of the Internet. Kenski and Stroud (2006)
found the Internet had neither a negative effect nor a positive effect on efficacy, knowledge,
or participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Additional researchers found those who are already
engaging in political behavior will use the Internet and these new tools to expand their political
space (Bimber, 2001; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Some researchers
have found the Internet to be at least as effective as face-to-face deliberation for motivating
individuals to vote (Hooghe et al., 2010), while Kenski and Stroud (2006) found that Internet use
was positively related to enhanced levels of political confidence. Boulianne (2011) also found
support for Internet use having a positive impact on political participation. The history of macrolevel studies of Internet has shown mixed results on political participation. On the other hand,
researchers who focused on microelements of the Internet have found that Internet use had a
positive effect on political participation rates.
In a micro-level study, Tolbert and McNeal (2003) found that Internet news consumption
positively influenced the likelihood of political participation. Similarly, Pasek et al. (2009)
concluded that those who consumed their news on the Internet were more likely to engage in
civic activities than those who did not. Most of the research on this level has yielded small, yet
positive and significant, associations, suggesting that the Internet is not going to be a
revolutionary space for democracy (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2010) found
that reading blogs increased the likelihood of political participation. Other researchers studying
individual media channels have found a different relationship. In a study on YouTube, the
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consumption of videos did not increase the likelihood one would participate (Towner & Dulio,
2011).
Additional researchers who have conducted micro-level studies found support for the
normalization narrative. Boulianne (2011) found that the consumption of television news was
the medium of choice for those citizens who were already interested in politics. Xenos and
Moy (2007) made political engagement the independent variable (IV) and found no significant
effect on the dependent variable (DV) of Internet use. Internet use was found to increase levels of
civic engagement (Hooghe et al., 2010). The authors of these models have not been able to
establish any directional significance in the relationship between new communication
technology use and political participation (Hooghe et al., 2010). The unclear relationship
between use of new communication technologies and political participation requires additional
research. Due to these conflicting results, causal models have yet to be developed to explain
the relationship between technology and political participation (Boulianne, 2009).
The focus of this study is younger voters. This segment of the population is turning to
alternate sources of information, such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and Last Week
Tonight. Increasingly this group is going online to get news and information from social
network sites, such as Facebook and YouTube. More needs to be done to understand the
motivations and political participation patterns of young citizens (Kaid et al., 2009). Research
has demonstrated that young citizens seem less interested and involved in politics than are
their older peers, and exhibit lower levels of PIE than do their older peers (Kaid et al., 2007).
One possible explanation for their lower levels of PIE is their cynicism toward the political
process.

29
Political Cynicism
Political cynicism has been identified as a primary attitude affecting citizens’ democratic
engagement (McKinney, Rill, & Thorson, 2014). Political cynicism is the dissatisfaction of
citizens toward politicians and the government (Balmas, 2014). Political cynicism is also defined
as the belief that elected officials are working in their self-interest and/or engaging in
dishonest behavior (Dancey, 2012). Citizens may also feel that politicians make campaign
promises with no intention of keeping them (Balmas, 2014). As a result, cynics tend to make
negative evaluations of politicians’ work habits, honesty, and integrity (Cappella & Jamieson,
1996).
Researchers who study political news have suggested that high exposure to strategic
news during an election campaign leads to an increase in political cynicism (Cappella &
Jamieson, 1996). Baumgartner and Morris (2006) found that viewers of The Daily Show
displayed more cynicism of the electoral system and the news media than did nonviewers. The
audience of The Daily Show largely overlaps with the demographics of digital natives.
Research has demonstrated that political cynicism decreases as younger voters grow older
and begin to engage in politics (Dalton, 2006). Scholars believe that technology alone will not
change historical rates of participation (Bimber, 2001). Access to this technology creates a
barrier and possible narrows the politically active segment of the population (Gibson, Howard,
& Ward, 2000). Concern initially centered on the skills needed to use the technology. Digital
natives have the necessary skills: Thus, research on Internet use and political participation will
likely find a positive or neutral relationship between the two (Gibson et al., 2000).
Many scholars view the Internet as the new home of civic engagement (Gibson et al.,
2000). Optimists have argued the Internet will increase levels of voting, contacting, and
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information gathering, as this media increases the rational and expressive benefits of participation.
Information becomes more easily available, and new electronic tools for more direct debate at the
mass level and between masses and elites are offered (Gibson et al., 2000). Political
communication research has moved to differentiation between the stimulation. The next phase of
research into the relationship between new communication technologies and political participation
requires examination of the reinforcement narrative (Marien et al., 2010).
The overwhelming amount of literature offering support for the optimists and normalists
guided this dissertation study. These two camps agree on many theories, including the fact that the
Internet may reinvigorate civic life by increasing access to political information and providing
alternative venues for political discourse (Marien et al., 2010). Future researchers will need to
differentiate between these two positions and offer clues to what new communication technology
may hold for political participation. Further, the most frequent users of this new communication
technology space are digital natives. Future researchers will need to discuss the ways digital
natives use new communication technologies (Kaid et al., 2009). In this study, the emphasis was
on understanding the use of new communication technologies, with a primary focus on users who
are digital natives. Additionally, this dissertation was intended to analyze the narratives
surrounding the effects of new communication technology on political participation. The aim with
this dissertation was to differentiate between stimulation and reinforcement models (see Figures 1
and 2) developed by Boulianne (2011) in order to gain insight into the relationship between the use
of communication technology and measures of political interest, citizenship, and institutionalized
political activities.
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Figure 1. Media use Stimulates Political Interest (Stimulation).
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Figure 2. Political Interest Motivates Media Use (Reinforcement).
The study of new communication technologies and political participation is still in the
beginning stages. Similar to the study of television use and participation, the field began with
researchers examining large conceptual entities, providing clues into the relationship between
media use and political participation, but often failing to account for the differences between the
individual components of the medium. This chapter outlined the literature concerning the political
concepts of participation and citizenship, with particular attention paid to political engagement and
PIE. The chapter covered the political side of political communication. The next chapter addresses
the communication side of political communication, beginning with a history of media effects
research.
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CHAPTER 3: MEDIA EFFECTS
Media Research
Since the beginning of the electronic communication era, scholars have debated the
effects of media consumption. This historical debate over media effects reached some
consensus, but with the changing political, social, psychological, and economic transformation,
debate continues over the effects of media (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Participants in the field are
still trying to make sense, conceptually, of the relationship between old and new media (Jensen &
Helles, 2011). The study of new media requires a brief history of the study of traditional media, as
well as acknowledgement of some foundational issues that need consideration in light of changing
media technology.
First, a definition must be established when discussing new communication technologies.
The definition used in this dissertation overlaps three basic constructs: interactivity, content
creation, and mobility. Social media networks such as YouTube and Facebook best represent the
interactivity afforded by new communication technologies. Social media commonly refers to the
conjunction of two concepts: Web 2.0 and user-generated content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).
Web 2.0 was first used in 2004 to describe the new approach used by developers that resulted in
applications no longer being created solely by developers; once the foundations of the
application are established, users drive continued development (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).
User-generated content is also a key facet of how social media differ from traditional
media. The primary content producers are the users of the medium, as opposed to professional
content producers. Social media lets users connect with other users to share and consume content.
While the naming conventions of these sites may vary, all social networks have the basic features
of interactivity and content creation in common (Boyd & Ellison, 2007).
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The final aspect of the new communication technologies used for this dissertation was the
mobility afforded by such technology. The ability to consume and create content in any location
is a foundational change of new communication technology. The increasing amount of political
media consumption taking place on these cellular phones requires future researchers to account
for this aspect of technology (Hill, Tchernev, & Holbert, 2012). As with any complex
constructions, the definition of social media has varied from study to study, but what all definitions
of new communication technology should have in common is the user and his or her role in the
center (Enli & Moe, 2013). With the user empowered at the center of new communication
technologies, consumers’ choice in their media consumption needs to be considered in the study of
media effects.
Bennett and Iyengar (2008) contended that due to the audience segmentation and
diversification of the 21st-century media environment, it is no longer relevant to think of
mass media and mass audiences. If the media no longer have mass audiences, mass effects
research requires further scrutiny. Bennett and Iyengar (2008) asserted that media effects
are no longer mass effects, but more on the lines of minimal effects. Due to the changing
media environment, not everyone agrees with this interpretation of media effects. The
question of the definition of mass effects has moved to the forefront of research: Do mass
effects have to be large effects, or can mass effects be a small effect on a large number of
people? Holbert et al. (2010) asserted that small effects on a large number of people are still
possible in the era of on-demand information:
An environment where the central process of persuasion has a more pronounced seat
at the media effects table—where we can begin to see the possibility of meaningful
and sizeable persuasive media influence in politics, not an era of minimal effects as
argued for by Bennett and Iyengar. (p.28)
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The definition of effect comes into focus with this discussion of minimal effects. A large
number of minimal effects could be interpreted as confirmation of existing attitudes rather than
as evidence of opinion change (Bennett & Iyengar, 2010). In their minimal effects research,
Holbert et al (2010) argued that reinforcement of political attitudes would be a minimal
effect while change in political attitudes would be a mass effect (Vaccari, 2013). Some scholars
have claimed the effects of political campaigns are minimal, because competing campaigns offset
each other and produce a minimal effect on the audience (Benoit, Hansen, & Holbert, 2004).
While the disagreement over effects remains, both groups of scholars have acknowledged
the changing era of media effects. Holbert et al. (2010) stated, “Although change is afoot, we
anticipate that its magnitude will be modest. Modern communication systems, including the
Internet, on which these changes are premised, are far from the first revolution in information
accessibility to influence political information consumers” (p. 30).
The transition from the era of the three big networks to the on-demand, personalized
nature of media today alters the effects of media. Media effects depend on how political media
consumption is conceptualized (Holbert et al., 2010). One conceptualization of media use is
reinforcement narratives. Some scholars believe media consumption is based upon pre-existing
beliefs, and media effects are limited because media use simply offers confirmation—that is,
reinforcement—of existing beliefs (Holbert et al., 2010). Other scholars believe that prior
factors influence a citizen’s political media consumption, such as seeking to satisfy entertainment,
informational, or social needs (Holbert, Lambe, Dudo, & Carlton, 2007).
Some scholars believe media use has consequences; thus, the potential exists for stronger
media effects, such as stimulation of political interest, for example (Holbert et al., 2010). The
rebuttal to this argument is that users will not choose to consume media that does not
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gratify their desires. Holbert et al. (2010) acknowledged the role of user choice in media
consumption and effects by stating, “We are confident that Bennett and Iyengar (2008) do not
intend to take a deterministic, technological dystopian view, yet broad generalizations about the
inherent threats to society posed by a technology push the scholarly debate in that direction.” In
response to this critique, Bennett and Iyengar (2010) argued that Holbert et al. (2010) missed
their main point that customized, on-demand content across a multitude of available platforms
will only lead to further homogenization of opinions. The concept of uses and gratifications
provides a lens to explain the role of audiences in the interactive media of the 21st century.
Uses and Gratifications
Uses and gratifications (U&G) marks a shift from the traditional viewpoint of “powerfulmedia-effects” theories, in which an audience is depicted as passive and easily manipulated by
media influences (Mondi, Woods, & Rafi, 2008). Using U&G as an approach to media study is
generally recognized to be a subtradition of media effects research; this approach accounts for
audience needs and the types of content they select to satisfy their social and psychological
needs (Ruggiero, 2000). Uses and gratifications theory is based on the notion that a medium
cannot influence an individual unless that person has some use for that medium or its message
(Rubin, 1983). The approach has undergone varying frequency of use, but currently has come
into vogue again with the combination of methodological refine and interactive media (Ruggiero,
2000).
A key assumption of U&G is the presence of an active audience member who makes a
motivated choice about media content (Ruggiero, 2000). That is, users choose the content they
are motivated to seek out. U&G provides a lens to understand the role of active user choice in
interactive media currently available. One significant advantage of U&G is recognition of the
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media’s ability to influence attitudes through motivating content consumption; however, the
negative side of U&G is narrow-minded media consumption. The on-demand nature of online
content lets people seek out media content that is consistent with their existing beliefs (Peer &
Ksiazek, 2011), raising the issue of selective exposure in media consumers.
Selective Exposure
The study of selective exposure theory emerged from the foundational studies of public
opinion research (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Initially, selective exposure was solely the domain of
limited media effects research (Stroud, 2010). This selective exposure debate was dormant for
many years, but with the changes in media at the beginning of the 21st century, it has reemerged
as a point of disagreement in mass communication research (Garrett, 2009b). Bennett and Iyengar
(2008) argued that the American media audience is extremely fragmented; today it would
take 100 networks to reach 80% of the country, whereas 30 years ago, three networks could
accomplish that feat. This fragmentation of television and the rise of new media provide a
massive amount of “ anytime options” for consumers, allowing consumers the freedom to
choose the media that satisfies their desires.
Selective exposure theory is based on the position that individuals prefer to be exposed to
arguments supporting their positions and will in fact consume media that support their
positions (Stroud, 2010). Other scholars have argued that selective exposure theory is just a
preference for agreeable information, as opposed to avoidance of disagreeable information
(Garrett, 2009b). However, Garrett (2009a) found evidence that people prefer agreeable
information, but also do not entirely avoid disagreeable information. Garrett (2009b) found that
individuals consistently sought support for their positions and were more likely to look at
information that confirmed their opinion and to spend more time reading that information.
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Towner and Dulio (2011) performed an experiment with YouTube content that offered support for
the selective exposure argument, in which users were much more likely to choose agreeable
content over dissenting information.
Recent efforts to differentiate between these two interpretations of the theory have
produced mixed results in the political communication field (Kahne, Middaugh, Lee, & Feezell,
2012). Some researchers have suggested that exposure to like-minded individuals correlates
with higher levels of political participation (Mutz, 2002). Tolbert and McNeal (2003) found
different results: The selection of only agreeable content on the Internet might actually be a
problem, increasing bonding social capita or strong relationships, which do not cross socioeconomic lines, leading to the further polarization of society. The selection of only agreeable
content could lead to lower levels of political knowledge. Political knowledge gain has been tied
to discourse involving opposition viewpoints; a discussion consisting of similar viewpoints, on
the other hand, does not contribute to political knowledge gain (Eveland & Hively, 2009). Along
similar lines, scholars worry that the ability to expose oneself to news content that coincides
with one’s views may lead to a polarized electorate (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). With political
knowledge firmly established as a requirement for political participation, the potential for a
polarized electorate could harm participation levels.
The polarization of the electorate has occurred simultaneously with the rise of new media
technologies (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Forty years ago, the majority of Americans consumed
their daily news from one of the three network newscasts (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). These three
newscasts employed similar norms of journalism that meant no matter which network
people watched, they consumed similarly balanced point-counterpoint content (Bennett &
Iyengar, 2008). Partisanship and polarization are two concerns of scholars in the context of
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media fragmentation. The growth in popular partisan cable news channels demonstrates a broader
institutional and cultural transformation (Peer & Ksiazek, 2011). With minimal effort, people can
access newspapers, radio, and television stations from around the world (Bennett & Iyengar,
2008). “Given this dramatic increase in the number of available news outlets, it is not surprising
that media choices increasingly reflect partisan considerations,” (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009, p. 20).
Using new media communication technologies may not be beneficial for democratic
debate, as the Internet may increase connections, but only among like-minded individuals (Tolbert
& McNeal, 2003). In a study of users’ network connections, Gaines and Mondak (2009)
found users of Facebook tend to be friends with members of similar ideologies, generating
communication only among like-minded individuals. In another study of polarization, Ellison,
Steinfield, and Lampe (2007) found that networks of similar members do not offer many
benefits, as opposed to diverse networks, which foster debate and tolerance.
This consumption of desired, agreeable content removes the conversation element from
democratic discourse (Bowers, 2004). The ability to choose news content that coincides with
one’s views could lead to a polarized electorate that does not feel the need to participate in
institutionalized democratic norms (Peer & Ksiazek, 2011). With a fragmented media landscape,
reconceptualization of media effects is required when examining the field in the 21st- century
media environment. Interest in the question of how media content consumption influences attitude
change is increasing in media effects research. An increasingly popular model to explain the ability
of information to effect attitude change is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Polk, Young, &
Holbert, 2009).
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Elaboration Likelihood Model
Different models have been established to explain the ability of media to effect attitude
change. One such model is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which is based on the idea
that attitude change is a result of information consumption (Polk et al., 2009). Attitude change is
defined as a shift in a person’s beliefs and behaviors (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM is the
interaction between four elements; levels of elaboration and processing routes. Two levels of
elaboration, high and low and two processing routes; central and peripheral are theorized in the
ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For this dissertation, attitude change is represented by the
confidence individuals have in their political knowledge.
The central processing route involves effortful or “deep” analysis of message
arguments—in other words, critical reasoning—whereas the peripheral route involves much
more automatic or “shallow” processing (Cacioppo, Petty, & Stoltenberg, 1985). If a message is
processed in the central route, its ability to persuade is limited by the power of the argument and
the individual’s existing thoughts on the subject (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). When
elaboration is high, the salience of the issue will have a greater impact on the ability of the
information to cause attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The combination of central
processing and high elaboration reduces the chance of the information to effect attitude change.
On the other hand, use of the peripheral route of message processing offers much more
potential for attitude change (Polk et al., 2009). In a message being processed with low
elaboration, it is more likely other variables than the message itself will influence the audience
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). For example, the motivation of audience members will influence
the way they process information.
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In the ELM, content consumption with high personal relevance will be more likely to be
processed along the central route, whereas content that lacks a connection to prior knowledge
will most likely be processed along the peripheral processing route (Polk et al., 2009). As the
ELM model implies, motivation also plays a role in which processing route is used (Wojcieszak
& Price, 2012). Motivation in the model is a circular action, as motivation is enhanced by
related factors, such as personal connections or issue salience (Wojcieszak & Price, 2012).
Analyzing content selection through a uses and gratification (U&G) paradigm sheds light on the
route through which messages will be processed. Individuals select media that satisfies particular
needs. When individuals have higher levels of motivation, they are more likely to critically
analyze the message (Polk et al., 2009). When messages are exposed to critical analysis, it is
less likely the person will change his or her attitude. Thus, it follows that if someone is
politically active, the person will critically analyze the message, making attitude change less
likely, especially when a message contains information that is inconsistent with the person’s
initial attitude (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For those who are not politically active, the message
will be sent via the peripheral process route and may influence only short-term attitude change.
This attitude change could be either an increase or decrease in political confidence.
Ultimately, the relationship between cognitive route and attitude change depends on the
strength of the underlying message arguments (Polk et al., 2009). In the presence of strong
arguments that resonate, central processing will likely increase persuasion; when arguments
are weak, central processing will decrease persuasion, as the receiver will be resistant to the
claims due to his or her active critical reasoning processes (Cacioppo et al., 1985).
Critical reasoning does not play the same role when messages are processed via the
peripheral route. When individuals peripherally process a message, emotion plays a stronger role
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(Polk et al., 2009). With emotion playing a larger role between content and attitude change, the
direct effect of the message might take on a larger role. In a study of satiric political news, The
Colbert Report was found to increase support for the conservative values that Stephen Colbert
directly expressed in his humor (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). The parody of conservatives
found in the program did not have the same effect. Viewers’ attitudes were not influenced to
be critical of conservatives (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).
It is clear that motivation, delivery, and content play a role in determining the route
through which individuals process messages. The ELM establishes a connection between content
and PIE. As Polk et al. (2009) stated, “It is also interesting to note that the ELM is driven by
the constructs of motivation and ability. Internal political efficacy is a unique iteration of
these, as efficacy could be conceptualized as perceived ability” (p. 216). Other scholars agree
on the application of the ELM in the new communication environment. Holbert et al. (2010)
argued that the basic tenets of the ELM have a substantive influence on the status of persuasive
outcomes in the current media environment. To clarify the effects of new communication
technologies and PIE, i n this study, social media as a key area of a micro-level study of the
Internet were examined.
One of the most popular forms of these new communication technologies is YouTube,
which encourages the consumption, production, and distribution of videos. The sharing of these
videos combined with the interactivity nature of the medium places YouTube in a unique
position as a new communication medium.
YouTube
The 2008 U.S. presidential election established YouTube as a significant source for
political communication (Mberia & Ndavula, 2012). In the 2008 election, seven presidential
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candidates announced their campaigns with online videos, 110 candidates registered channels on
YouTube, and over 220 million users viewed political content during the election (May, 2010).
YouTube is rated as the second most popular Web site worldwide, with over 800 million unique
visits per month (Paek, Hove, & Jeon, 2013). In addition, YouTube itself created a special
election channel (Towner & Dulio, 2011), and YouTube cosponsored one of the debates
with CNN (McKinney & Rill, 2009).
The format of YouTube allows candidates to reach voters with different types of
information not available in traditional media formats (Towner & Dulio, 2011). The special
election channel allowed users to upload their content to each campaign, as well as consume
content created by the respective campaigns. The design of YouTube allows users to post
comments, “ like” videos, and access other interactive features. In addition to consumption,
citizens can also use this medium to express themselves (Potter, 2005). In the migration of
democratic space into an online environment, interactivity is a key component, and YouTube
channels fill that space by providing a space for conversation and two-way dialogue.
Research has shown that digital natives who get political information from YouTube are
more likely to participate in online political activities (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). Greater
participation in noninstitutionalized democratic activities, such as talking to others about
preferred candidates, increases the reported likelihood of voting (McKinney & Rill, 2009). In a
study of online videos, people who did not previously use YouTube, but were exposed to the
medium during the experiment, were more likely to be influenced by YouTube content (Towner
& Dulio, 2011). These results further support the stimulation narrative and offer hope for
optimistic scholars. In spite of this, Towner and Dulio (2011) concluded that some Internet
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usage may be beneficial for democracy, but YouTube in particular does not appear to be
beneficial for democracy.
YouTube’s architecture has some inherent functionality that changes media production
and consumption; people turn to YouTube for its content. One facet of YouTube that requires
further research is the difference between producers of online video content and consumers of
the content.
Producers and Consumers
The rise of user-generated content on YouTube as well as other sites provides an
illustration of the blurring of the distinction between media producers and consumers (Ornebring,
2008). New communication technologies have opened the possibilities of content creation and
distribution to the individual. YouTube is the most common of the many Web sites that provide
the capability of producing, distributing, and discussing videos (Paek et al., 2013). This
foundational change in the capability of Internet users should be considered part of the construct
measuring the relationship between technology and participation. In sum, user-generated content
is an important theoretical phenomenon requiring further study in order to understand its
relationship with political participation (Dylko & McCluskey, 2012).
Leung (2009) found that people who create content on the Internet were more likely to
engage politically than were those who just consumed Internet content. This difference between
producers and consumers of new media content is new in political communication research.
Researchers studying digital production have had difficulty distinguishing among communication,
participation, production, and consumption in the study of new communication technologies
(Schradie, 2011). I n this dissertation study, the expanding field of user-generated content
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effects was examined by investigating this difference between producers and consumers of new
media content.
Early researchers who examined producers and consumers and political engagement
did not find a significant relationship between producers and levels of political engagement
(Leung, 2009). The construct needs further explanation, as a weak positive correlation has
been found between producers and political efficacy (Leung, 2009). In a preliminary survey
of YouTube users, significant differences were found between producers of YouTube content
and consumers of YouTube in their noninstitutional political activity (Stouffer, 2013).
Further, in an analysis of national survey results, differences between producers and consumers
of digital content were found. The differentiating factor was education: Those with higher
education produced a greater amount of online content than did those with just a high school
education (Schradie, 2011). Barriers to Internet access and to the production of online content
require further analysis.
Digital Divide
The digital divide has been a popular area of study since Bill Clinton and Al Gore began
to use the term in 1996 to describe the socioeconomic gap between people who had computer
access and those who did not (Schradie, 2011). In the ensuing years, various aspects of access
have been researched. In fact, the issue of access is at the forefront of the discussion of whether
technology is to offer any solution to declining rates of democratic participation. In mediating a
technology-based conversation, it is important that the technology not be a barrier for participation
(Sorensen & Murchú, 2004). A number of factors restrict access to YouTube, but the most
common is economic. Reliable, fast, low-cost Internet access is not available to millions of
Americans, both urban and rural. Technology must target the low-end user to allow equal
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participation (Sorensen & Murchú, 2004). Pessimists have cited the technological divide as a
potential limitation of the ability of the Internet to stimulate participation (Russell, 2005).
Most researchers have suggested college-aged men and women are using new
communication technology in equal numbers (Jones, Johnson-Yale, Millermaier, & Pérez, 2009).
Internet use, however, is not equal among all age groups, with younger citizens using technology
in far greater numbers compared to their older counterparts (Lariscy et al., 2011). Correlation
studies of race and technology use are less conclusive; some studies have shown race to be a
barrier, and others have indicated that it is not (Jones et al., 2009).
Traditional barriers to political participation need re-examination in the light of usergenerated content. A survey showed that among online users, minority groups—AfricanAmericans, Latinos, and Asians—tend to create online content more frequently than White
students (Correa & Jeong, 2011). Optimists point to increased access as a reason new
communication technologies will enable increased political engagement. Technology has
brought many people out of isolation, and enabled their involvement with politics (Schradie,
2011).
Pessimists have pointed to existing differences of online content creation as evidence that
technology is not expanding participation to those previously unengaged. Schradie (2011) claimed,
As creative content applications and uses have grown, the poor and working class have
not been able to use these production applications at the same rate as other uses or users,
creating a growing production divide based on these elite creative functions. Regardless
of the type of activity, a critical mechanism of this inequality is consistent and high
quality online access at home, school or work and having a high-status information
habitus and Internet-in-practice. These cultural and material factors are more significant
for the production of online content than they are for consumption. (p. 165)
The ability to create online content offers potential to stimulate participation, but the traditional
barriers to access still play a role in the relationship between new communication technologies
and political participation.
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Barriers like gender and age have often been noted with regard to political participation.
For example, highly educated, older males are the most likely to take part in the American political
process (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). Education also plays a role in the relationship
between online content creation and political engagement (Schradie, 2011). The student sample
used in this dissertation study made the analysis of educational level as a moderating variable
impossible; however, in this dissertation, other traditional socioeconomic barriers, such as gender
and race, were examined as moderating variables in the relationship between new communication
technologies and political participation. One of the key concepts involving how communication
changes with online content creation is the flow of communication. No longer is communication a
one-way flow from professional producers to consumers. The flow is now multidirectional, and the
interactivity of this experience requires further research.
Interactivity
YouTube was the primary medium studied in this research. The concepts underlying
YouTube are user choice and interactivity. Interactivity was one of the primary manipulations
employed in this experiment to test the effect of interactivity on each participant’s political
confidence. Scholars need to conceptualize online political activity in two different ways,
information seeking and opinion expression (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010). Wang (2007), in his
factor analysis, found support for these conceptual distinctions of online political activity.
Tedesco (2007) also classified interactivity in similar ways, with the interaction being either
user-to-user or user-to-system. With the rise of new communication technologies, the concept of
interactivity has been fundamental to political communication studies (Dimitrova, Shehata,
Strömbäck, & Nord, 2014).
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Previous researchers generally found support for the theory that more active forms of
political Internet use affect citizens’ political involvement more strongly than do more passive
forms (Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2013). In this study, interactivity
was further investigated through manipulation as one of the IVs of this study. The interactivity
used in this dissertation was based on a theoretical division used in past political communication
research (Katz, Rice, & Aspden, 2001; Kruikemeier et al., 2013; Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010;
Tedesco, 2007). Interactivity has been divided into the actions of passive information seeking
and active information consumption (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010). This study was designed
to test these different types of interactivity based on the conceptual distinctions. The first
interactive condition mirrored traditional media and provided the participants no interactive
options.
The second interactive condition was based on passive information seeking and provided
the user with limited choice over the political content they consumed. This condition mirrored
the Tedesco (2007) limited interactivity condition. This condition was based on passive
information seeking (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010) with no discussion component.
The final interactive condition was highly interactive, involving participants’ exchanges of
opinions with the other participants, as well as their choices of content and their expressions of
opinions about the content. Thus, this condition also mirrored the highly interactive condition
used by Tedesco (2007). Katz et al. (2001) argued that information exchanges occurring in
online discussions reflect active information consumption behavior and use different cognitive
processes compared to information consumption processes that lack a discussion component,
such as seen in the medium interactive condition. While mobility and interactivity play a central
role in new communication technology, the content available through those technologies is

48
still the central reason that individuals visit social media Web sites (Baumgartner & Morris,
2010).
Content
When researching political content, scholars must examine political advertising, due to
its uniqueness and to the central role it plays in the electoral process (Kaid, McKinney, &
Tedesco, 2009). Exposure to these advertisements has been found to affect existing partisan
beliefs, with a significant impact on voters (Kaid et al., 2009). Televised political advertising
also has been shown to be particularly effective at persuading undecided voters (Bowen, 1994)
and those who are not highly involved in politics (Rothschild & Ray, 1974). Benoit, Leshner, and
Chattopadhyay (2007) in their meta-analyses found that political ads have significant effects on
viewers. These advertisements are capable of influencing perceptions of the candidates’ character,
affecting attitudes toward candidates and stimulating interest in the campaign, among other effects
(Benoit et al., 2007).
This study used functional theory of campaign discourse to guide content development.
Specifically, social media content in the form of political advertisements was manipulated based
on the four tenets of functional theory. In functional theory of campaign discourse, first, each
citizen votes based on which candidate appears preferable or based on other particular issues that
are most important to the voter (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006). Second, candidates must distinguish
themselves from their opponents in order to be preferable (Padgett, 2009). Third, the goal of
political campaign messages in those campaigns is to establish the differences between candidates
(Benoit, Stein, & Hansen, 2005). The fourth proposition requires that political campaign messages
can occur on only two potential topics: (a) the candidate’s policy positions, past deeds, plans, and
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goals with regard to governmental action and problems amenable to governmental action; and (b)
the candidate’s personal qualities, leadership ability, and ideals (Padgett, 2009).
According to functional theory, political advertisements can accomplish one of three
functions: acclaim, attack, or defend. The first option for a candidate is to engage in self-praise, or
acclaim (Benoit, Blaney, & Pier, 1998). Second, candidates can engage in an attack of their
opponent (Benoit et al., 2005). The third option for a candidate who has been subjected to attack
is to defend against those attacks (Benoit & Airne, 2009). In this dissertation study, the acclaim
option of functional theory was used as a lens to focus the examination. The dissertation also
included user-generated content. The user-generated content also used the acclaim function. In
this experiment, user-generated content was built into the browsing experience, generating content
from participants. The coding of this content followed the principles of grounded theory of
constant comparison, which was particularly useful for the coding of user-generated comments
(Paek et al., 2013).
Grounded Theory of Constant Comparison
Review of the political communication literature revealed little research on the use of
theory to guide the creation of hypotheses predicting the content of the comments. In the absence
of existing theory to inform the creation of content categories, the grounded theory approach of
constant comparison was employed during content analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The
grounded theory approach of constant comparison consists primarily of finding differences and
creating categories directly from the data (Keyton, 2011). Grounded theory takes on the approach
of de-emphasizing previous theory and hypotheses, generating theory instead by examination of
the data (Glaser & Strauss, 2009). Grounded theory has central tenets for the coding of data that,
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while not meant to be formulaic and overly rigid, do require adherence to use the approach
successfully (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).
A typical approach to grounded theory is to first review the data without any attempt to
code them (Keyton, 2011). The second review of the data is called initial coding, which involves
looking for relationships (Boeije, 2002). The next pass through the data is a coding process in
which all categories are organized around a central theme (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The fourth
pass through the data is to compare and contrast the categories that emerged (Keyton, 2011).
Referencing the preceding literature review, four hypotheses and research questions were tested.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis addressed the ability of interactivity to influence political information
efficacy (PIE). Highly interactive media consumption is positively associated with political selfefficacy (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010). Social media use has been found to have a positive
relationship with political participation (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011). Nisbet and Scheufele (2004)
also found that online political information consumption, when combined with discussion,
increased political efficacy. Experimental research from the 2004 campaign revealed that exposure
to interactive Web content significantly increased both internal and external efficacy for young
adult participants, whereas participants in the noninteractive exposure condition did not produce
significant increases in efficacy (Williams & Tedesco, 2006). The following hypothesis guided this
study:
H1: Consumption of political content in the interactive conditions will increase PIE more
than will consumption of political content in the noninteractive condition.
The functional theory of campaign discourse established the use of policy
advertisements as the most frequently used type of political advertising (Benoit & Sheafer,
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2006). The most popular form of advertisements should also be the most effective in generating
interest in campaigns. However, functional theory has not been used to guide experiments to
test if these advertisements are the most effective. In order to test the effectiveness of the most
frequently used types of advertisements, a second hypothesis was proposed:
H2: Consumption of political content covering the policies of candidates will increase
PIE more than will consumption of character-based political content.
Selective exposure theory is based on the position that individuals prefer exposure to
arguments supporting their positions and will consume media that support their position
(Stroud, 2010). Selective exposure indicates that those who are not interested in politics will not
consume political content. In the traditional media era, it was nearly impossible for citizens to
avoid political content, and institutionalized participation occurred in greater frequency
(Lariscy et al., 2011). With the changed norms of society, citizens can avoid political content,
and their levels of political confidence remain low. If those participants are exposed to political
content, that content has the possibility to stimulate interest in political activity (Boulianne,
2011).
H3: Consumption of political content will increase PIE more in low-engaged citizens
than in high-engaged citizens.
H4: Exposure to political content will increase PIE.
Research Questions
With the changing norms of American citizenship argued by Dalton (2009), empirical
research needs to continue to examine how these norms function within alternate mediums. The
research into how users are using new media is in its early stages. Researchers have begun to
examine the relationship between producers and consumers and political engagement (Leung,
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2009). Thus, two research questions were proposed to investigate the relationship between uses
and gratifications of people’s media habits and political engagement.
RQ1: What is the relationship between the participants’ political engagement, content
creation and consumption habits, and change in PIE from exposure to the stimuli?
RQ2: What is the relationship between the different interaction conditions and levels of
PIE?
In the next chapter, the methods by which the hypotheses and research questions were
tested are explained.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
This dissertation used two experimental designs. The first design used was the pre- and
posttest design. This design is the most common type of experimental design (Colosi & Dunifon,
2006). Using a pre- and posttest design allowed the assessment of changes in participant
knowledge and attitudes toward the political content the participants were exposed to during the
study (Colosi & Dunifon, 2006). Many researchers prefer this type of experimental design as
measurements at two intervals allows attitude changes to be detected after participation in the
study (Colosi & Dunifon, 2006).
The second design was a repeated-measures posttest design to handle the presentation of
political content. This design allowed control over the political content the participants viewed and
allowed me to establish causal connections between media exposure and participants’ reactions
(Towner & Dulio, 2011). A posttest-only design is not ideal for all experimental conditions, but in
a repeated-measures design, the use of a posttest-only design is viable (Campbell, Stanley, &
Gage, 1963). A repeated measures design had several additional advantages, such as a more
definitive evaluation of dependent variables facilitated by the collection of measurements across
time and multiple conditions (Yi, Logan, Glueck, & Muller, 2013). The second advantage of this
design was that the participants acted as their own control groups through multiple exposures to a
stimulus (Sullivan, 2008). The combination of precise measures and multiple exposures resulted in
an increase in statistical power, useful for detecting changes in study participants through the use
of a repeated-measure design (Yi et al., 2013). The next step was to operationalize the variables
used in the experiment.
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Operationalization
Literature from previous studies guided the operationalization of the variables. The variable
of political information efficacy (PIE) was operationalized with the same four questions used by
Tedesco (2011). As detailed in the literature review, the process to theorize and test the variable
has a rich history. The PIE variable was measured with four questions, which were used to ask
participants about their confidence in their political information, measured on a five-point Likert
scale. Tedesco (2011) performed research with multiple stimuli and measured PIE during the
pretest and posttest. Between his recent research and his history with the concept, Tedesco’s
research offers strong support for his operationalization method. Tedesco (2011) produced strong
reliability scores both times he measured PIE, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 on the pretest and .90
on the posttest. See Appendix A for the questions.
The second variable to operationalize was citizenship, which was analyzed with two
constructs of citizenship: duty-based and engaged. An examination of the two constructs allowed
comparison of empirical voting behaviors with other studies, as well as comparison of the
changing norms of American citizenship as noted by Dalton (2009). The variable was
operationalized as defined by Dalton (2008), using nine questions, which focused on participants’
perceptions of their obligations as citizens such as supporting the military and obeying laws,
measured on a five-point Likert scale. See Appendix B for the questions.
The next variable measured prior political interest through participants’ online political
expression. This variable was measured with five questions on a five-point Likert scale. The
questions focused on the frequency of participants’ use of different new communication
technologies, such as blogs, Facebook, and YouTube, to express their political beliefs. Zhou and
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Pinkleton (2012) used the index and had a Cronbach’s alpha of .78. See Appendix C for the
questions.
New media use was measured with three questions to gauge the subjects’ content creation
frequency on the Internet. This variable allowed the division between Internet consumers and
producers. The questions centered on the amount of time participants’ spent creating content
on blogs, Facebook, and YouTube. The index was developed by Leung (2009) and
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .85. See Appendix D for the questions.
The final variable that required operationalization was voting behavior. To correct for
limited research into nonpresidential election year political behavior, a multi-item construct
was created to measure voting behavior through engagement beyond presidential elections.
The variable was an index created from four questions, with a binary question for voting in the
2012 presidential election combined with questions to measure participants’ efforts to vote. The
questions focused on their efforts to vote in local and nonpresidential elections. The questions were
measured on a five-point Likert scale. See Appendix H for the questions.
Procedure
Participants for the study were recruited through a departmental research subject pool.
The pool was drawn from an introduction to public speaking course that was a campus-wide
required course. The even distribution of majors alleviate potential concerns over a research pool
conducted within a department, where a high concentration of communication and political science
majors could have influenced the effects of political communication research.
Student samples can offer valid results if used properly to analyze a relevant population.
In this study, the population of interest was digital natives. If a study is well guided by theory,
and if the sample has multiple similarities to the target population, the use of student
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samples are appropriate (Bello, Leung, Radebaugh, Tung, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2009). This
study focused specifically on youth voters and multivariate relationships. Multivariate
relationships between media use and celebrity feelings were found to be significant when using
both students and representative samples (Basil, Brown, & Bocarnea, 2002).
Further, student samples have been shown to be an appropriate sampling technique for
certain studies (Peterson, 2001). Combining a theory aimed at explaining youth behavior with a
sample of college-aged people made a strong case for using a student sample in this research.
The methodological choice combined with the multivariate analysis indicated the choice of
sample population should not jeopardize the validity of the research.
The research pool allowed participants to sign up at their convenience to participate in the
study. The experiment took place in the department’s research computer laboratory. Once
participants entered the computer laboratory, they were welcomed, seated at a computer, and
briefed on their rights as research participants. After informed consent was obtained, the
researcher explained the procedure and directed the participants to the pretest questionnaire. The
questionnaire contained questions about PIE, political behavior, citizenship values, online
political behavior, and new media use.
Once the pretest questions were completed, participants viewed and navigated through all
six stimuli. The stimuli were presented in a random order to each participant. After exposure to
each stimulus, participants answered multiple-choice distraction questions about what they
remembered from the content, followed by the four questions of the PIE variable. After the
stimuli, participants were directed to the post-exposure questionnaire to answer questions about
their citizenship, age, gender, race, voting behavior, and, finally, the four questions of the PIE
variable again.
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Stimuli
The content of the stimuli was of two different types, either policy- or character-based on
the functional theory of political discourse. The stimuli were created using as much authentic
political content as possible. The creation of the content began with searching for political content
from current Michigan elections. To minimize name recognition, political advertisements from the
2014 gubernatorial election were not used. Instead, material from statewide elections for U.S.
Senator and Secretary of State were used. In order to keep content as relevant to participants as
possible, advertisements were selected from political races in the state of Michigan. Once
Michigan content was exhausted, political content from races in Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio,
and Massachusetts were used in the study.
In order to assure adherence to functional theory, a multistep coding and testing process
was used. After preliminary coding by the researcher, a pretest was performed with other
graduate students to evaluate their agreement with the function of the content. The content
featured video political advertisements and print-style campaign news stories. See Appendix
E for an example of the content.
The content was altered as needed to fit theme requirements. A professional editor
performed any changes to the political advertisements; the resulting changes were unnoticeable
to participants, as determined by a survey of other graduate students who viewed the altered
videos. The researcher also altered the political news stories as needed. A professional
journalist was asked to read the stories as a validity check. The journalist determined the stories
were written inverted pyramid-style or feature-style and deemed them publishable.
The final content element of the high interactivity condition was the user-generated
comments that accompanied each video. Comments found with the advertisements were used
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whenever possible. The user names were changed to protect the identity of the commenter. To
maintain ecological validity, native comments relating to the theme of the advertisement and
comments that were slightly off topic were both used. All of the comments used were categorized,
according to functional theory as acclaim function. Comments coded as attack or defensive were
not used. In the appropriate condition, each political advertisement featured four comments. For
political advertisements that did not have four acclaim comments on YouTube, the researcher
created comments.
In addition to content, each stimulus varied on interactivity. Interactivity had three
conditions: high, medium, or none. The first stimulus condition, high interactivity was based upon
YouTube. The stimulus featured actions a user could take on social media. In this level of
interactivity, the participants selected the order in which they viewed five political advertisements.
Each political advertisement was accompanied by user-generated comments. The participants read
these comments and were required to create and post their own. The participants then selected the
next advertisements they wished to watch and repeated the process until all advertisements were
viewed. Once they watched and posted comments on all five videos, the stimulus was completed,
and they were directed to the post-stimulus questionnaire. The high level of interactivity tested the
theoretical active information consumption behavior (Katz et al., 2001).
In contrast to the high interactivity condition, the medium type of interactivity resembled
political news websites, such as Politico. In this stimulus, the participants selected a story from
a list of headlines. They read a political news story about a candidate. After the completion of
the story, they chose which story to read next. Once the participant read all three stories, they
finished this stimulus and were directed to the post-stimulus questionnaire. The medium level
of interactivity required that participants only consumed information, as opposed to the high

59
interactivity stimulus where they consumed and actively engaged with information.
Information consumption is a different cognitive process from active information consumption
with a discussion component (Katz et al., 2001).
The third interactive condition, none, lacked interactivity and was meant to mirror more
traditional mass media consumption. The static stimulus only allowed users to view one political
advertisement after another. Participants viewed four political advertisements. Passive
information consumption was the theory driving this Web site experience (Kushin & Yamamoto,
2010). Thus, each participant was exposed to six stimuli. Each stimulus combined policy or
character content with a different level of interactivity. The 3 x 2 experimental design tests
within-subjects variables with varied interactivity (high, medium, none) and content (character,
policy). See Table 1.
Table 1
Experimental Design
Content
Character

Policy

High
Interactivity

Medium
None

Each stimulus required about five minutes to consume the presented information. Six
stimuli were built for the experiment, with a simulated Web site designed for each interaction and
content combination. The benefit of using a simulated websites as opposed to using YouTube or
Politico was that it allowed control of the content the participants viewed (Towner & Dulio,
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2011). The presentation of similar political content to what a digital native might encounter in
the real world offered strong evidence regarding the effects consuming Internet political
content has on young voters. This type of design increases the experimental realism of the
results and boosts external validity, allowing the generalization of the results to other digital
natives (Towner & Dulio, 2011). The next chapter presents the results of the experiment and the
analysis of the data.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
In this dissertation, four hypotheses and two research questions were proposed concerning
the effects of political media consumption on internal political confidence. After initial review of
the data, two additional hypotheses and two research questions were developed post-hoc. Post-hoc
testing offers the potential for bias, but with exploration of new concepts where little theory exists
can be used appropriately (Ruxton & Beauchamp, 2008). With little theory guiding user-generated
comments and media producers and consumers post-hoc hypothesis were developed.
The results of the experiment follow, beginning with descriptive data of the participants.
A total of 152 participants completed the experiment at a large urban Midwest university.
Three participants were removed from the final analysis due to technical issues with simulated
Web sites not properly functioning, and two participants were removed for skipping of content.
Four additional participants were removed due to repetition of responses. Thus, the final results
comprised data from 143 participants, recruited from a research participant pool that gave extra
credit for students in participating classes. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 53 years
(M = 21.83, SD = 4.786), and 62.9% (90) were women. The racial makeup of the sample
consisted of 46.9% (67) Caucasian; 25.9% (37) African American; 10.5% (15) Asian; and 9.1%
(13) Middle Eastern/South Asian. The experiment was conducted between February 12 and April
21, 2014.
Political information efficacy (PIE) was measured with four Likert index questions ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) based on an index created by Tedesco (2011). PIE
was collected eight different times during the experiment, both before and after all stimuli and after
each Web site browsing experience. The Cronbach’s alpha of the pre-exposure measure of PIE was
.789 and .887 on the posttest. Cronbach’s alpha of the social media interactivity condition was .878
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for character-based content and .846 for policy-based content. Cronbach’s alpha of the online news
interactivity condition was .920 for character-based content and .890 for policy-based content.
Cronbach’s alpha of the static interactivity condition was .876 for character-based content and .895
for policy-based content. Reliability scores were calculated for citizenship norms. Nine
questions regarding two different types of citizenship were asked. Results for the two
constructs of citizenship were collected—duty-based and engaged—as defined by Dalton
(2008). Duty-based citizenship achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .550 and engaged-based
citizenship measures achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .386. The removal of politically related
questions from both scales changed the reliability scores for the indexes. See Table 2 for the
reliability scores, and see Appendix B for questions.
Table 2
Citizenship Norms Cronbach’s Alpha
Engaged Citizenship

Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted

Form Opinion

.209

Support People Worse Off

.248

Politically Active

.575

Volunteer

.273

Duty-Based Citizenship
Report a Crime

.450

Obey Laws

.485

Support the Military

.452

Serve on Jury

.418

Vote

.659
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Participants’ political engagement was measured in two different ways. The first measure
was the binary of voting in the 2012 Presidential election. Political engagement as determined by
the measure indicated 77 (53.5%) participants were engaged and voted and 67 (46.5%) were not.
The second measure was designed to advance understanding of nonpresidential election voting by
creating a voting behavior index. The voting behavior index combined the binary of voting in
the 2012 presidential election with three additional Likert-scale questions, which measured effort
to vote in local and state elections. See Appendix F for the questions. Cronbach’s alpha of the
index was .860. The median of the index (M = 2.666) was used to divide high-engaged and
low-engaged citizens. The resulting variable comprised 76 (53.1%) high-engaged and 67
(46.9%) low-engaged participants.
The next index test for reliability was the online political expression index. The index was
a measure of the participants’ frequency of discussing and engaging in political communication
using new communication technologies. The index was on operationalization of the concept by
Zhou and Pinkleton (2012). The index in their original operationalization achieved a Cronbach’s
alpha of .780. In this study, the measure had a Cronbach’s alpha of .856.
The final index that needed reliability analysis was new media use. The index measured
the use of different new communication technologies. Leung (2009) developed the index. In the
initial operationalization, Leung (2009) achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .850. In this study, the
index achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .455. This index, as well as the citizenship index that
achieved unacceptable reliability scores, is analyzed further in the discussion section.
Despite the low reliability scores, the creation of the consumers and producers categories
commenced. The measure took the median point of the amount of time participants spent creating
new media content, 16–30 minutes (2.333, on the 1-to-5 Likert scale), and used it to categorize
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the participants. The results were 109 (76.2%) consumers who spent 30 minutes or less
creating new media content and 34 (23.8%) producers who spent 31 minutes or more creating
content on an average day. See Appendix D for the questions.
The primary statistical test used in this dissertation study was a repeated-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA). One of the assumptions of this test is normality of the data. Of the eight
measures of PIE gathered in this experiment, seven violated this assumption of normality. The preexposure measure of PIE was normally distributed, but the other seven measures were positively
skewed. Two different data transformation techniques were employed in an effort to correct the
normality issues. First, in accordance with Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the square root was
calculated to fix moderately positive skewed data. This data transformation did not fix the
normality issues of the data. The next step was to transform the data using the technique for
substantially positive skewed data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggested applying a logarithmic
scale to the data. This data transformation did not solve the normality issues. After the
unsuccessful testing of two data transformation techniques, further literature was consulted to
determine the most appropriate solution to deal with the normality issues.
Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, and Bühner (2010) suggested ANOVAs are strong
enough to handle violations of normality. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) also suggested that if all
the normality issues are similar in nature, data transformation only offers negligible results and
may be unneeded. Testing of skewed data revealed that using an ANOVA even with the
assumption of normality yielded results with the same chance of Type 1 and Type 2 errors
(Schmider et al., 2010). Other tests have found similar results. Schmider et al. (2010) also
performed regression analysis that indicated normality violations were not a significant factor in
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ANOVA results. With the support of the preceding literature, the analysis went forward,
retaining the original positively skewed data in testing the hypotheses.
H1 predicted that consumption of political content in the interactive conditions
would increase PIE more than consumption of political content in the noninteractive
condition.
A repeated- measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were
statistically significant differences in pre-exposure PIE compared to PIE scores collected after
each interactive political content consumption session. A visual inspection via a boxplot
confirmed a lack of outliers in the data. The assumption of sphericity was violated, as assessed
by Mauchly’s test of sphericity, χ2(5) = 162.765, p = .001. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was applied (ε = 0.569). PIE was statistically significantly different after participation in the
experiment, F(1.707, 242.432) = 15.304, p = .001, partial η2 = 0.097.
Post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed that PIE did not vary significantly
between each of the experiment’s conditions. PIE did have a significant change from
preintervention to each subsequent measure of PIE. PIE decreased from preintervention
(M = 2.837, SD = 0.811) to high interactivity (M = 2.494, SD = 0.764), medium interactivity
(M = 2.479, SD = 0.832), and no interactivity (M = 2.475, SD = 0.771). The conditions’
differences were not significant when noninteractive compared to medium interactivity
95% CI [0.118, 0.110], p = 0.999, compared with high interactivity, 95% CI [0.113, 0.074],
p = 0.999, and high interactivity compared to medium interactivity, 95% CI [0.097, 0.127],
p = 0.999.
This hypothesis was also tested for between-subject effects, using the demographic
variables as moderating variables. There was no statistically significant interaction between the
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type of interactivity and race, divided into White, Black, and other, F(2, 140) = 0.28,
p = .398, partial η2 = .013. There was no statistically significant interaction between the type
of interactivity change and gender, F(1, 141) = 0.058, p = .811, partial η2 = .000. There was also
no statistically significant main interaction effect between gender, race, and interactivity,
F(2, 140) = 1.170, p = .314, partial η2 = .017.
H1 was not supported. The hypothesis predicted an increase in PIE due to exposure with
a greater increase in the interactive conditions. Instead, the experiment found a significant
decrease due to exposure, with a similar decrease found for each interactivity condition. See
Table 3 for the results.
Table 3
Interactivity & PIE
Interactivity Condition

PIE

Pre-Exposure

M = 2.837, SD = 0.811

No Interactivity

M = 2.475*, SD = 0.771

Medium Interactivity

M = 2.479*, SD = 0.832

High Interactivity

M = 2.494*, SD = 0.764

*p < .05 from pre-exposure measure
H2 predicted that consumption of political content covering the policies of candidates
would increase PIE more than consumption of character based political content.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were statistically
significant differences in PIE after the exposure to different types of political content. A visual
inspection via a boxplot confirmed a lack of outliers in the data. Mauchly’s test of sphericity
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 111.539, p = .001. A
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (ε = 0.644). PIE was statistically significantly
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different from the pre-exposure measure compared to measures collected after different types of
content consumption, F(1.288, 182.847) = 18.334, p = .001, partial η2 = 0.114, with PIE
decreased from pre-exposure (M = 2.837, SD = 0.811) with exposure to character content
(M = 2.454, SD = 0.762) and policy content (M = 2.512, SD = 0.774).
Post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed that PIE did not significantly
differ in change to policy or character content. There was not a significant decrease as a result of
character content compared to policy content, p =.271.
This hypothesis was also tested for between-subject effects, using the demographic
variables as moderating variables. There was no statistically significant interaction between the
type of content and race, divided into White, Black, and other, F(2,137) = 1.024, p = .362, partial
η2 = .015. There was no statistically significant interaction between the type of content and gender,
F(2,137) = 0.281, p = .597, partial η2 = .002. The main interaction between content, race, and
gender was not significant, F(2,137) = 1.202, p = .304, partial η2 = .017.
H2 was not supported. The hypothesis predicted policy content would increase PIE. The
experiment resulted in a significant decrease in PIE to both policy and character content. The
decrease as a result of policy content was smaller, but not statistically different from character
content. See Table 4 for the results.
Table 4
Content and PIE
Content Condition

PIE

Pre-Exposure

M = 2.837, SD = 0.811

Policy

M = 2.512*, SD = 0.774

Character

M = 2.454*, SD = 0.762

*p < .05 from pre-exposure measure
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H3 predicted that consumption of political content would increase PIE more in lowengaged citizens than in high-engaged citizens.
Engagement was measured in two different ways for this hypothesis. Using the first
measure of engagement, the binary of voting in the 2012 election results, two tests were employed.
An independent samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U test revealed similar results. Seventy-seven
participants voted in the 2012 presidential election, and 66 did not. High-engaged voters had
lower levels of PIE change (M = 0.016, SD = 0.787) than did low-engaged voters
(M = 0.109, SD = 0.741). There was homogeneity of variances as assessed by Levene’ test for
equality of variances (p = .690). There was not a statistically significant difference in PIE
scores between types of voters, t(141) = .728, p = .468, d = 0.122.
Measuring engagement on the voting behavior index and using the median split to divide
participants into groups of low-engaged and high-engaged and comparing with change in PIE
resulted in non-normally distributed data, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p < .05). A MannWhitney U test and independent samples t-test resulted in similar differences in PIE change
scores between low-engaged and high-engaged participants. There were 76 high-engaged and 67
low-engaged participants. PIE scores increased after participation in the experiment for highengaged participants (M = 0.062, SD = 0.700), whereas low-engaged participants (M = -0.197,
SD = 0.817) had a decrease in their PIE after content consumption and this difference was
statically significant t(141) = -2.051, p = .042, d = 0.342.
H3 was not supported. The hypothesis predicted a greater effect on low-engaged voters
versus high-engaged voters. In both cases, the content from the experiment resulted in a
decrease for low-engaged participants. The measure of engagement did change the interpretation
of the hypothesis: A decrease in PIE for high-engaged participants was seen when engagement
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was measured by voting, and an increase in PIE for high-engaged participants was seen when
engagement was measured by the voting behavior index. See Table 5 for results.
Table 5
Engagement and PIE Change
Engagement

PIE Change

2012 Presidential Voting
High-Engaged

M = -0.016, SD = 0.787

Low-Engaged

M = -0.109, SD = 0.741

Voting Behavior Index
High-Engaged

M = 0.062, SD = 0.700

Low-Engaged

M = -0.197, SD = 0.817

H4 predicted that exposure to political advertisements would increase PIE.
In a visual inspection for outliers, one outlier was detected that was more than 2.5 boxlengths from the edge of the box in a boxplot. Inspection of their values did not reveal it to be
extreme, and it was kept in the analysis. The pre-exposure PIE scores (M = 2.837,
SD = 0.811) decreased to the postexposure scores (M = 2.777, SD = 0.934). The decrease was
not significant as measured by a t-test, t(142) = 0.928, p = .355, d = 0.077. H4 was not supported
due to the significant decrease found in PIE.
RQ1 focused on the relationship between the subjects’ political engagement, content
creation and consumption habits, and change in PIE from exposure to the stimuli.
The results of a two-way ANOVA revealed there was homogeneity of variances, as
assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance (p = .303). There was not a statistically
significant interaction between new media producers and consumers and engagement as
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measured by voting in the 2012 presidential election on change in PIE, F(1,139) = .292, p = .590,
partial η2 = .002. There was not a significant interaction based on engagement, F(1,139) = .577,
p = .449, partial η2 = .004 and type of new media user, F(1,139) = 1.534, p = .218, partial
η2 = .011 on change in PIE.
There was not a statistically significant interaction between new media producers and
consumers and engagement as measured on the voting behavior index on change in PIE,
F(1,139) = 1.120, p = .292, partial η2 = .008. There was not a significant interaction based on
engagement, F(1,139) = 1.197, p = .276, partial η2 = .009 and type of new media user,
F(1,139) = 2.283, p = .133, partial η2 = .016 on change in PIE.
RQ2 involved the relationship between the different interaction conditions and levels
of PIE.
A repeated- measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were
statistically significant differences in PIE between each type of interactivity. A visual inspection
via a boxplot confirmed a lack of outliers in the data. Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that
the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 8.220, p = .016. A Greenhouse-Geisser
correction was applied (ε = 0.946). PIE was not statistically significant between different types
of interaction conditions, F(1.893, 268.778) = .128, p = .870, partial η2 = .001. PIE measured
after high interactivity (M = 2.494, SD = 0.764) compared to PIE after medium interactivity
(M = 2.479, SD = 0.832) and similarly after the none interactive condition (M = 2.475,
SD = 0.771).
After analysis of the initial hypothesis and research questions, two additional post-hoc
hypotheses were developed. Two research questions were also developed after completion. The
combination of additional data availability and the complexity of the relationship between new
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communication technology and political participation warranted further analysis. The post-hoc
hypothesis and research questions were generated around producers of new media content and
user-generated content. The combination of the exploration of these themes and their secondary
prominence in this dissertation makes post-hoc an appropriate approach of study. The results of
those hypothesis and research questions follow.
PHH1: Participants who voted in the 2012 presidential election will show higher
motivation to vote in local and nonpresidential elections.
A visual inspection via a boxplot confirmed a lack of outliers in the data. An independent
samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U test revealed similar results. Seventy-seven participants
voted in the 2012 presidential election; 66 did not. The motivation to vote was measured with
three questions regarding participants’ voting habits in local and nonpresidential elections. See
Appendix F for the questions. Presidential voters had higher levels of voting behavior
(M = 3.437, SD = 1.129) than did nonpresidential voters (M = 2.131, SD = 1.025), resulting
in a statistically significant difference, t(141) = 7.189, p = 0.001. There was homogeneity of
variances, for change in PIE scores for high-engaged and low-engaged voters, as assessed by
Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .216). The hypothesis was supported, indicating
those who voted in the 2012 presidential election had significantly higher motivation to vote in
local, state, and nonpresidential campaigns than did those who did not vote in 2012.
PHH2: High-engaged participants will participate in more political expression than will
low-engaged participants.
Online political expression measured the participants’ use of blogs, Facebook, email, and
other new communication technologies to express political opinions. See Appendix C for the
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questions. Online political expression was compared between the two measures of political
engagement.
Comparing online political expression with the engagement of participants as measured
by voting in the 2012 presidential election showed no outliers in the data, as assessed by a
boxplot. An independent samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test revealed similar results. There
were 77 high-engaged participants and 66 low-engaged participants. High-engaged voters had
higher levels of online political expression (M = 2.039, SD = 0.903) than did low-engaged
voters (M = 1.748, SD = 0.760). There was a statistically significant difference between
online political expression and high-engaged and low-engaged participants, t(140.963) = 2.087,
p = 0.039, d = 0.351. There was not homogeneity of variances, for online political expression
for high-engaged and low-engaged voters, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of
variances (p = 0.048).
Comparing online political expression with the engagement measured on the voting
behavior index showed no outliers in the data, as assessed by a boxplot. An independent
samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test revealed similar results. There were 76 high-engaged
participants and 67 low-engaged participants on the voting behavior index. High-engaged
voters had higher levels of online political expression (M = 2.015, SD = 0.894) than did lowengaged voters (M = 1.779, SD = 1.025). There was a marginally statistically significant
difference between online political expression and those high-engaged and low-engaged
participants, t(141) = 1.672, p = .097, d = 0.281. There was homogeneity of variances for
online political expression for high-engaged and low-engaged voters, as assessed by Levene’s test
for equality of variances (p = .117). Levene’s test for equality of variances tests two or more
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groups from a population for the same variance, as one assumes two samples from the same
population will have the same variance.
The hypothesis was marginally supported. Again, the results varied by the measure of
engagement. Measuring engagement by 2012 presidential voting, those who voted had
significantly more online political expression than did those who did not vote. Measuring
engagement on the voting behavior index, the results were marginally significant, with highengaged participants using new communication tools more frequently for political expression than
did low-engaged voters.
PHRQ1: What is the relationship between consumers/producers and online political
expression?
Comparing online political expression with the content creation and consumption habits
resulted in no outliers in the data, as assessed by a boxplot. An independent samples t-test
and Mann-Whitney U Test revealed similar results. There were 109 content consumers and 34
content producers. Producers had higher levels of online political expression (M = 2.311,
SD = 0.926) than did consumers (M = 1.778, SD = 0.787), and this difference was statistically
significant, t(141) = -3.306, p = .001, d= 0.556. There was homogeneity of variances for
online political expression for producers and consumers, as assessed by Levene’s test for
equality of variances (p = .064).
PHRQ2: What is the relationship between new media use and online political expression?
A Pearson’s product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship between
online political expression and new media use. Preliminary analyses showed the relationship to
be linear without any outliers in the data. There was a moderate positive correlation between
online political expression and new media use, r(141) = .284, p =.001. Time spent expressing
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political views online accounted for 8% of the variation in new media use, meaning more
online political expression equated with more new media use.
After the analysis of the original and post-hoc hypotheses and research questions was
completed, the analysis focused on the features of new communication technologies. Usergenerated comments created as part of the high interactivity condition were recorded and were
analyzed as part of this dissertation.
The experiment produced user-generated comments created during the high interactivity
Web site experience. The participants’ entered comments in response to the political
advertisements and other user-generated comments they consumed. The interactivity of the
condition was meant to simulate the use of social media. The focus of this experiment was on
the cognitive processes behind the interaction rather than on the user-generated content.
In the exploration of user-generated content, grounded theory of constant comparison was
employed to analyze the content created in this experiment. The grounded theory approach
encompasses several steps. The creation of a codebook began with an initial review of the data.
During the second review of the data, preliminary categories were developed. In the third
review, refinement of the categories continued with the search for relationships between the
different themes. The final step of the coding process was achieved with a review of the central
theme of the user-generated comments. Four initial categories were developed. Another
prominent feature of the grounded theory approach is the encouraged collaboration with other
researchers (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). After the creation of the initial categories, another
doctoral candidate was consulted. The ensuing discussion resulted in the creation and refinement
of a codebook.
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The creation of the codebook resulted in four categories. The first category was “asking
a question,” containing comments such as “What has he done other than help the vets?” The
second category was “expressing support for the candidates,” similar to “The candidate seems to
have a clear goal and agenda.” The third category was “expressing disagreement with the
candidates,” such as “I don’t think ‘road on Indiana’ is a good ad because it did not show
anything of him doing something,” and “other.” During postcoding consultation with the
consulted doctoral candidate, the “other” category was refined even further with “replies”
emerging as a new category out of the “other” coded user-generated comments. A number of
the comments in the “other” category were replies to other comments in the experiment.
Intercoder reliability was not performed on the grounded theory categories. Glaser and
Strauss (2009) stated the problem with intercoder reliability is the “verificationism effect” of
testing data. Researchers often look to confirm their initial thoughts through their testing of data.
As Ryan (2005) discussed, grounded theorists rarely conduct intercoder reliability tests due to
their desire to discover new social phenomenon. The user-generated comments collected in
this dissertation were intended to explore new research by describing the content with the
emergent categories. Little empirical evidence exists as to which techniques of identifying themes
work best (Ryan, 2005).
The user-generated comments were analyzed in different ways. A chi-square test was
conducted between type of content and comment generated in response. All expected cell
frequencies were greater than 5. There was a statistically significant difference between one
category of comments and policy or character content, χ2(9) = 30.729, p > .001. The difference
centered on greater support for candidates being expressed after exposure to policy content. See
Table 6 for the results.
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Table 6
User Generated Comments by Content Type
Content Type
Character

Comment Type

Frequency

Percentage

Ask a Question

30

20.9%

Express Support

64

44.7%

Express Disagreement

37

25.8%

Other

12

8.3%
100%

Policy

Ask a Question

20

13.9%

Express Support

91

63.6%

Express Disagreement

17

11.8%

Other

15

10.4
100%

The next analysis compared the type of comment from both policy and character content
and producers and consumers. There was not a statistically significant association between
character content and media usage habits, χ2(3) = 4.419, p = .246. Policy content and user type did
not have a statistically significant association either, χ2(3) = 4.916, p = .178. In a comparison of
political engagement and comment type, no statistically significant relationships were found
between content categories and either measure of engagement. Gender and race did not have
statistically significant relationships with comment type as well.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
The macro area of study in this dissertation is the relationship between new communication
technology and political participation. At the heart of this discussion is the disagreement over the
current health of American democracy. The effect of technology on participation will play a key
role in the future of American democracy. Three narratives have dominated scholarly debate about
the effects of new communication technologies on political participation. (Bennett et al., 2011).
One narrative emanated from those who expected new communication technology to stimulate
participation among those previously unengaged (Delli Carpini, 2000). The pessimists, on the
other hand, expected new communication technologies to occupy individuals’ limited time and to
harm participation rates (Putnam, 2000). Proponents of the normalization narrative expected new
communication technologies to become just another tool to reinforce political interest of people
who were already engaged (Bimber, 2001; Boulianne, 2009; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004).
This study was intended to add clarity to the relationship between media and political
participation. The study specifically focused on examining new communication technologies and
their effects on political participation. The relationship between new communication technologies
and political participation is influenced by many factors and variables. In this experiment, this
research isolated a few key variables related to new communication technology and tested the
effects of exposure to the media on political confidence.
A consensus has begun to emerge concerning the relationship between new communication
technologies and political participation around the optimist and normalists narratives. Boulianne
(2009) found in her meta-analysis of 38 studies and 166 effects between new communication
technologies and political engagement,
that there is little evidence to support the argument that Internet use is contributing to
civic decline. The findings suggest that the effect of Internet use on engagement is
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positive. However, the question remains: Are these effects substantial? The average
positive effect is small in size. (p. 205)
Boulianne (2011) found support for the normalization narrative: the effects of new
communication technologies seemed to reinforce existing attitudes. People who were engaged in
politics used the new communication technology space to engage in political discussion; exposure
to political content on unengaged citizens did not increase their political behaviors (Wright, 2012).
The results of this research indicate support for the pessimists and the belief that exposure
to political content can harm voters’ confidence and thus decrease the likelihood they will vote.
The results contradict the prevailing literature on the relationship between new communication
technology and political participation. The unexpected findings necessitate a further review of the
literature surrounding the conflict. Boulianne’s (2009) meta-analysis showed that a majority of
studies (45%) found a statistically significant positive relation between new communication
technology and political participation and that 4% found a statistically significant negative
relationship. See Table 7 for the complete results. The negative results found in this experiment are
not unprecedented, but they place this study in the minority of studies examining the relationship
between new communication technology and political participation.
The meta-analysis demonstrated the variety of ways Internet use has been measured and
data collected. Some studies compared Internet users and nonusers; other studies examined hours
of Internet use, years of experience using the Internet, or types of Internet use; many studies used
Internet surveys as the mode of data collection and as a result could not compare Internet users
and nonusers (Boulianne, 2009). This made finding a harmful relationship by comparing the
studies difficult. One Internet- based survey did return similar results to this study. In a national
survey, Gibson et al. (2000) found that the effect of Internet use on political engagement was
negative.
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Table 7
Aggregate Findings on Internet Use and Engagement
Significance
Positive Effects

Negative Effects

74

45

Not statistically significant

53

32

6

4

20

12

0

0

13

8

166

100

Statistically significant*

Statistically significant*
Not statistically significant

Total

% of total effect

Statistically significant*

Not statistically significant
Direction not reported

No. of effects

*p < .05; Source: Adapted from “Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of
Research”, by S. Boulianne, Political Communication, 26, p. 198, 2009
In addition, Gibson et al. (2000) found a negative relationship between online socializing
and political engagement. The online socializing index included such activities as online
political discussion. Similarly, the results of this study found a negative relationship
between Internet use and political engagement. The other studies finding a negative relationship
possessed stark differences in methods that made comparison difficult. For example, the studies
featured methods such as random sampling technique in large populations and in-person surveys
(Boulianne, 2009). In this chapter, the focus is on individually examining the results of each
hypothesis and research question, as well as the post-hoc hypotheses and questions.
The first hypothesis were designed to investigate the relationship between interactivity
and PIE. The expected results, based on the literature, predicted a positive relationship between
exposure and PIE, with the high interactivity online experience to have an even greater effect
than the medium and static experiences. The results indicated a significant decrease between preexposure PIE and PIE after each different type of interactivity condition. The results did not
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show a difference between the conditions and their effects on PIE. The decrease of political
confidence could be due to the motivation of the participants to consume political content.
The ELM was used to explain the effects of information on consumers and their attitude
change (Polk et al., 2009). As the ELM implies, motivation also plays a role in determining
which cognitive processing route is used (Wojcieszak & Price, 2012). Therefore, motivation is
a key element in the ELM. The results of this study indicate uncertainty regarding the
motivation of participants to process the content from the experiment. The engagement levels
of the participants were similar to national voting rates, with 53.7% of the sample having
voted in the 2012 presidential election.
An additional factor contributing to motivation was the salience of the content. Comparing
the local and salient political content to the rest of the political content in the experiment revealed
significant differences. A t-test comparing the local to non-local content in the high and none
interactive conditions revealed significantly higher levels of PIE for local content, See Table 8.
The salience of the content to the participants is a potential reason for the decrease in PIE levels.
The low salience of non-local content contributed to low motivation levels when the content was
being cognitively processed.
Table 8
Differences between Content Proximity
Mean
Pair Comparison

t

Sig.

Difference
Local – Non-Local Non Interactive

0.188

3.02

.003

Local – Non-Local High Interactive

0.169

-2.79

.005
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With low motivation, the content was processed via the peripheral processing route.
Content processed via the peripheral processing route has an easier time to effect attitude change
than content processed via the central route. Content processed via the peripheral route may
produce short-term attitude change, but does not have lasting effects.
The decrease in PIE as a result of this experiment could have been a short term effect of
lowering participants confidence. One explanation is the political content was able to decrease
political confidence via the peripheral processing route. Information processed via the peripheral
route often leads to short-term attitude change (Baumgartner and Morris, 2008). Without
longitudinal studies, determining the process route of the information from this experiment is
impossible, but with motivation as one of the primary factors that determines which processing
route information travels, the lack of motivating political content may explain the peripheral
processing. Additionally attitude change after a short exposure to content indicates peripheral
processing was used. If central processing were used attitude change would be less likely to occur
after a short exposure to political content such as the experience in this experiment. A significant
factor in determining which processing route is used is the salience of the content to the consumer
and their motivation to analyze the material.
Motivation plays a significant role in the processing route content takes in the ELM. The
lack of salient political content could have lowered the participants’ motivation to analyze the
information critically. Research has demonstrated that prior political motivation is a significant
moderating variable between political advertisements and large effects (Shen, 2004). The
combination of the low motivation levels could have affected the processing route of the content
and thus the ability of the content to effect attitude change. The decrease in self-confidence from
political content exposure has been found in other studies. For example, Yamamoto and Kushin
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(2013) found exposure to political content via social media increased apathy and decreased selfconfidence. Other studies with student samples found small effects on attitude change (Benoit,
Leshner, & Chattopadhyay, 2007).
“Social media also may foster social fragmentation, prompting users to build walled
gardens to retreat into websites where selectivity is the governing ethos of content exposure”
(Yamamoto & Kushin, 2013, p. 11). Building “walled gardens” in social media is similar to the
effects of selective exposure theory. Selective exposure studies have found social media reduces
the likelihood of exposure to counter veiling political content (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). This
reduction of information diversity could lead to harmful effects for American democracy. The
selective exposure of social media is similar to social capital studies.
Narrow networks of information and connections are related to lower levels of political
participation. Bridging social capital crosses lines of division and exposures people to a diversity
of viewpoints. Selective media exposure results in a spiral of silence and the narrowing of
available information. Both theories have the same effect; harming American democracy.
Some scholars have viewed YouTube as a potential cure for such issues (Baumgartner &
Morris, 2010). However, research from this dissertation and other studies reveal YouTube and
other interactive websites may not be the cure to prevent the ability of users to build niches of
information with new communication technologies, increasing selective exposure and harming
online social capital.
Interactivity alone does not explain the relationship between users and political confidence.
The results mirror previous studies on YouTube (e.g. Towner & Dulio, 2011) concluded that
Internet usage may be beneficial for democracy, but YouTube in particular does not appear to
be beneficial for democracy. The principles behind the YouTube maybe beneficial for democracy,
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the interactivity and the content specifically examined in this dissertation and found on YouTube
do not have seem to have a specific positive effect on democracy. The role of content found on
YouTube needs to be examined further.
The first hypothesis also tested for traditional barriers of participation, such as race and
gender. In general, confidence declined in this experiment; gender and race were not found to have
a moderating effect between new communication use and political confidence. No main significant
effects were found between race and PIE or between gender and PIE. Given the negative results of
this study, it is no surprise that gender and race did not reveal significant differences. Findings in
the literature have been mixed on the prevalence of traditional barriers to participation in Internet
studies. New communication technology causing decreased levels of political confidence would
support pessimist scholars who have argued traditional barriers to participation are still present
(Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Marien et al., 2010).
While support for the pessimists was found in this research, traditional barriers to
participation were not associated with statistically lower levels of confidence. The question
remains, if exposure already has a negative effect on confidence, is it possible for it to have an
even larger negative effect when accounting for gender and race? Research has demonstrated that
noninstitutionalized participation has been less divided along gender lines than has institutionalized
participation (Marien et al., 2010). In this light, the lack of gender differences was not surprising.
Kenski and Stroud (2006) found race to be less of a factor for those Hispanics and AfricanAmericans with Internet access than for those without. The participants in the experiment all have
the option of regular Internet access with their enrollment in the university. Race might be less of a
factor in a sample that has access to information via the Internet.

84
The second hypothesis tested the content of political advertising. The hypothesis predicted
policy-based content would be more effective at increasing confidence. Policy-based content is
more frequently used by politicians and would be expected to be more effective due to its frequent
use (Benoit, et al., 2004). The results of the second hypothesis revealed a statistically significant
decrease in confidence after exposure to both content types. The decrease was lower with exposure
to policy content versus character content; however, there was no statistically significant difference
between the two. Similar results have been found in the past, with exposure to both policy and
character content having the same effect (Shen, Dardis, & Edwards, 2011). Exposure to political
information on traditional, less interactive Web sites has been found to increase political
disaffection (Yamamoto & Kushin, 2013). Exposure to policy content resulted in less of a decrease
in confidence than did exposure to character content. The fact that policy content appeared to be
more effective than character content, even if negative in this case, is a similar finding to results
reported in functional theory literature in which policy content was employed more frequently than
character content by politicians (Benoit et al., 2007).
The same arguments about ELM processing detailed in the first hypothesis apply here: The
participants’ peripheral processing may have produced apathy from exposure to the content and a
subsequent decrease in confidence levels. The hypothesis also tested for gender and race
differences and found neither to be a significant moderating factor.
The third hypothesis predicted that the exposure to political content would have a greater
effect on low-engaged citizens versus high-engaged citizens. The results found exposure to have a
negative impact on both groups: Their confidence levels decreased after exposure. More lowengaged voters’ PIE scores decreased, compared to the number of decreases seen in the scores of
high-engaged voters, but the difference was not significant.
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This hypothesis tested engagement in two ways to correct for a history of overreliance on
voting as a measure of engagement (Dalton, 2009). The first measure-categorized engagement
based on 2012 presidential voting. The second measure of engagement was created through the
voting behavior scale, with the median point dividing high-engaged and low-engaged
participants. By this measure, high-engaged participants had a slight increase in PIE and lowengaged participants showed a decrease. The difference was statistically significant, but with
the opposite effect the hypothesis predicted.
The third hypothesis focused on participants’ selected exposure and content consumption.
High-engaged participants consumed political content to reinforce their political interest and
viewpoints; low-engaged participants avoided political content due to selective exposure and
lacked confidence in their choices. According to the ELM, exposure to content with high
personal relevance will be more likely to lead one to process content along the central route,
whereas content that lacks a connection to prior knowledge will most likely be processed
along the peripheral processing route (Polk et al., 2009). The lack of salience of the content was
apparent for both high-engaged and low-engaged participants. The results of this hypothesis
provided further evidence for the pessimist camp, who believe that new communication
technologies have a negative effect on political engagement (Putnam, 2000).
The presence of a difference in the results of the hypothesis depended on the measure of
engagement used. The difference provided insight into the problem concerning scholars about
the narratives of technology and participation. Measuring engagement by tracking traditional
presidential voting supports the position of the pessimist camp, while using a more inclusive
engagement measure offers support for the normalists. The results conflict depending on the
definition of engagement, thus exemplifying the difficulty in determining the relationship
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between new communication technologies and political engagement. The conflicting results
found in this hypothesis do not add clarity to the debate; if anything, these findings only add to
the debate’s complexity.
The fourth hypothesis predicted that exposure to political content would increase PIE. In
fact, the results indicated the opposite, a decrease. The decrease was slight and not statistically
significant. Research using PIE as the dominant theory supports a positive increase in PIE due to
content exposure (Tedesco, 2011). However, a similar change in direction has been previously
found. For example, Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) found that online political content consumption
had a slight negative effect on participants’ political efficacy. Bimber (2001) also found that
exposure to political information alone did not increase participation. “Having access to the wealth
of political information and communication available through the Internet is not by itself connected
with participation,” (Bimber, 2001, p. 61). The results offer support for the pessimists, who think
new communication technologies will harm democracy. The results indicate exposure to content
alone is not enough to change the confidence of individuals. Previous research has found that
selected exposure to nonpolitical content is related to political cynicism (Lariscy et al., 2011). One
possible explanation of the decrease in confidence is a potential increase in political cynicism.
Political cynicism has been studied primarily as an outcome of exposure to political
advertising. Several studies have documented increased levels of cynicism among potential
voters because of negative political ads (Lariscy et al., 2011). Cynicism may also be related to
the framing of political content. Researchers have suggested when coverage focuses on issues
besides substantive policy content, voters become more cynical, and their confidence decreases
(Lariscy et al., 2011). The stimuli of this experiment contained both policy and character
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content, so a possible effect of exposure to the content would be an increase in cynicism and a
decrease in PIE.
The results of the experiment failed to support the positive hypothesis generated prior to
the experiment. The significant results add support for the pessimists and normalists. The results
further cloud the relationship between media and political engagement. The research questions, as
well as post hoc work, were part of an attempt to clarify this relationship further.
The first research question focused on the relationship between political engagement,
media consumption, and production. The results did not include any significant effects when
comparing the change in confidence in the participants. The results did, however, demonstrate a
difference between producers and consumers and their engagement levels. High-engaged
producers of new media content had a positive change in PIE, whereas both groups of lowengaged and high-engaged consumers showed decreases in their confidence levels (see Figure 3).
High-engaged participants increasing their confidence through the experiment provides further
support for the normalization narrative. The difference between the producers and consumers
needs further explanation. One difficulty in studying producers and consumers is the blurring of
the lines between the two on social media Web sites. Social media Web sites encourage interaction
centered on user-generated content; the user becomes both content producer and content consumer
(Yamamoto & Kushin, 2013).
One possible explanation is achieved through a uses and gratifications lens. User-generated
content on the Internet, civic engagement, and psychological empowerment have received
significant interest in recent years, and some evidence has emerged that user-generated content on
the Internet facilitates psychological empowerment (Leung, 2009). If producers of user-generated
content are using central cognitive processing routes in the creation of online content, content
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consumers might be more open to consuming online information through a similar processing
route. With Internet users becoming more used to interacting with media rather than passively
consuming it, producers believe that there are audiences for the content they produce, leading to
the potential of activating cognitive process unseen in other Internet users (Leung, 2009).
YouTube embodies the combination of this user influenced content production. YouTube and the
empowerment of its users to create frequent and mobile content needs further study.
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Figure 3. PIE Change by Media Consumption
The second research question expanded upon the first hypothesis and focused on the
difference between each interactivity condition. The differences between the types of interactivity
conditions were not significant. The PIE resulting after exposure to highly interactive content was
the greatest, but not significantly different from the PIE resulting from medium or no
interactivity. Both the medium and static interactive conditions had similar levels of PIE after
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exposure. This experiment did not find any difference between the interactive conditions as
previous studies have found (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010).
The result from the research question mirrors the results of Baumgartner and Morris
(2010), who found support for the pessimist narrative that youth who use social media tend to
have less political knowledge than their counterparts who rely on traditional media sources. The
research question provides evidence that interactivity alone does not increase confidence. The
interactivity of social media and other online news sources did not lead to an increase in political
knowledge (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). Ruling out the interactivity of social media as a
positive effect leads to the examination of content or some other explanatory factor to describe
the relationship digital natives have with politics.
The first post-hoc hypothesis predicted that participants who voted in the 2012 election
would have higher levels of voting behavior. This hypothesis was created to evaluate the voting
behavior index. The voting behavior index achieved a high level of reliability; further evaluation of
the index through this hypothesis adds validity to the index. The difference between the groups,
M = 3.437 vs. M = 2.131, respectively, revealed the constructs were similar and measured similar
behavior. The different nature of the engagement measured by the voting behavior index allowed
for deeper analysis of political participation, beyond just measuring presidential voting behavior
alone. Presidential voting often serves as a measure of institutionalized engagement (Dalton,
2006); however, the measure raises the question, should casting one vote every four years count as
being engaged? The voting behavior index was designed to correct this deficiency by measuring all
voting behavior to determine the difference between high- and low-engaged participants. The
significant differences produced using this measure, as seen from the results of the third hypothesis
and confirmation of its validity, raised significant criticisms of previous literature. Has the majority
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of political communication literature measured political engagement with a simplistic or inaccurate
operationalization? Does a more complex and accurate measure of political engagement include
local and statewide election behavior as well as presidential election behavior? The results of this
research indicate that an alternative measure of engagement would alter the literature surrounding
the collision of new communication technologies and political engagement.
The second post-hoc hypothesis predicted that high-engaged participants would have
higher levels of online political expression than would low-engaged participants. The results were
marginally statistically significant when using the voting behavior index (p = .097). The results
were statistically significant when analyzing engagement with 2012 presidential voting (p = .039).
The results support the normalists’ narrative, showing those already interested in politics who
engaged in institutionalized participation were the ones using new media technology to engage in
noninstitutionalized participation in greater frequency than individuals who did not participate in
politics. The main factor that drives optimists is the easy information availability new technology
affords (Delli Carpini, 2000). In contrast, Bimber (2001) argued the cost of information was not a
significant variable in political engagement, and the availability of information via the Internet
would not increase participation. The results of this hypothesis support the normalists’ position that
those engaging in offline institutionalized activities are the ones using the new technologies to
engage in online noninstitutionalized activities.
The first post-hoc research question involved the relationship between consumers and
producers and online political expression. The results included a statistically significant difference
between consumers (M = 1.778) and producers (M = 2.311) of new media content and their
frequency of online political expression. The results revealed those who spend more time creating
content online also spend more time creating political content online. These results might indicate
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a relationship between spending time online and using some of that time to engage in politics. Uses
and gratifications research offered some explanations here, indicating users seek out what they
want on the Internet (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). In the current media environment, digital
natives are empowered to avoid content they deem undesirable and to seek out content they deem
agreeable. A user of these social networking sites, where much of the online content is usercreated, allows users to seek out agreeable information and limits participation to online activities,
which does not translate to offline behavior such as voting in elections (Baumgartner & Morris,
2010).
The second post-hoc research question was intended to account for this relationship,
building upon the first question, which involved the relationship between the amount of new media
use and online political expression. The question encompassed both variables on a continuous
level. The results showed a statistically significant relationship, with online political expression
accounting for 8% of the variation in new media use. The results revealed a moderately positive
correlation. Thus, the results indicate additional support for the normalists’ narrative.
The experiment also collected comments in the highly interactive condition, during which
participants entered responses to other comments and video. The comments were coded using the
grounded theory of constant comparison. The majority of the comments expressed support for the
candidates. The significant differences found between the supportive comments between policy
content and character content support functional theory. Functional theorists have claimed that
policy content is used more frequently and thus is more effective than character content (Benoit,
Brazeal, & Airne, 2007). The experiment found 91 comments expressing support from exposure to
a policy-content stimulus and 64 supportive comments from a character-content stimulus.
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The hypothesis about interactivity did not generate any significant results. The significant
differences between user-generated comments and content support the central tenet of the Web:
Content is king. It is not the medium that makes the differences in political engagement, but
the content created and consumed on that medium (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010).
In this dissertation project, the objective was to understand the relationship between
American democracy and new communication technologies. Prior research has divided scholars
into three schools of thought: optimists, pessimists, and normalists. The results of this dissertation
study support both the pessimists and the normalists. One way to explain the mixed results is
through a uses and gratification paradigm, which focuses on why participants use communication
technologies. Coleman, Mendelson, Kurpius, and Lieber (2004) argued that content was the most
important factor of new communication technology as it related to political attitude change. If
content is the most important factor, participants in this experiment might have been alienated by
the content of the experience, which resulted in a slight negative change in their confidence.
The motivation an individual brings to his or her use of media is an important factor in
political confidence. If an individual is motivated to use the Internet for informational purposes, his
or her political efficacy increases; however, if a person uses the Internet for entertainment
purposes, Internet use harms political efficacy (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002). The conclusion places
uses and gratifications as the key theory explaining the effect of new communication technologies
on political confidence. Politically interested individuals turn to the Internet to satisfy the
motivation to expand and express their political knowledge. The participants of this experiment,
which generated low levels of political engagement, were possibly alienated by the political
content; their confidence decreased as a result.
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Researchers involved in the debate over the effects of media continue to try to reach a
consensus in terms of the power of new communication technologies to effect attitude change.
Experts in the field are still struggling to come to an agreement regarding the relationship between
new technology and traditional media (Jensen & Helles, 2011). The support for the normalists’
narrative places this study squarely in the minimal media effects area. Vaccari (2013) looked at
reinforcement of political attitudes and found minimal effects. The results of this dissertation
project add further depth to the research concerning the intersection of new communication
technology and political participation, but fail to provide clear answers that fit in with existing
literature. The results of this study also raise new questions for future studies, and as with many
studies, include limitations in drawing conclusions from these results.
Limitations
The first limitation to note of this research involved the sample. This dissertation overcame
those limitations by focusing specifically on digital natives and multivariate relationships. First,
using a nonrepresentative sample of students has been shown to be an appropriate sampling
technique for studies of digital natives (Peterson, 2001). In the study, the goal was to examine
multivariate relationships, which were found to be significant when using both representative and
nonrepresentative samples (Basil et al., 2002). Even with the effort to overcome the limitations of a
convenience sampling technique, it is important to note the sampling technique as one limitation of
the research. This study can provide support for the broad arguments, as well as for the conclusions
about the sample, but cannot support generalization of the findings to all American digital natives.
Another limitation was the relevancy of the content used in the experiment. The
dissertation included local content relevant to Michigan voters whenever possible, but many of the
political advertisements were from nearby states. The relevance of this content may have been
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partially responsible for the directional change of PIE. Comments entered by participants reflect
this as a possible limitation of this study, comments such as “I have no comment on what’s
happening in Indiana. I’m in Detroit… we’re the ones who need the help lol” were found in
response to many advertisements. User-generated comments such as this raise the possibility that
the content increased political cynicism and decreased confidence. Data on political cynicism was
not collected during the experiment; however, the results combined with further research on the
concept point to this factor as a possible explanation for the results of the experiment.
A third limitation of this study was the reliability of the citizenship norms construct.
The study was designed to account for the differences in 21st-century citizenship norms (Dalton,
2009) and therefore collected support for statements concerning engaged and duty-based
citizenship norms. The low reliability scores of both measures prohibited any analysis using the
constructs. Dalton (2009) contended the norms of citizenship are changing, and that partially
explains the lower rates of participation. The constructs were intended to be used to help
explain the relationship between digital natives and political participation. The reliability
scores achieved for both the engaged and duty-based citizen norms prevented the use of the
index to explain the relationship between the two phenomena.
With both citizenship constructs achieving unreliable results for their respective indexes,
the argument Dalton (2008) made that norms of citizenship are changing failed to find support
from this study. Both the traditional duty-based and the newer engaged citizenship failed to find
reliable indexes. One possible explanation is that the questions regarding citizenship did not reflect
the new norms of citizenship. While Dalton was correct that people are concerned about helping
others, they may be helping according to a new cause-oriented micro-personal political agenda
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(Bang, 2009). The decrease in confidence and the failure to support Dalton’s argument provide
further support for the pessimists. The changing norms of citizenship need further research.
The final limitation addressed is the fatigue effect created by repeatedly measuring PIE. A
significant decrease was found between initial and final measure of PIE. There were not any
significant differences found between the first and subsequent measures of PIE. A fatigue effect
remains a possible explanation of the decrease found overall in the experiment, as participants may
have tired of answering the same questions eight times during the experiment. Nevertheless,
support for a fatigue effect is limited, as the eighth and final measure of PIE increased from the
second through seventh measures. A fatigue effect would likely have resulted in a steady decrease
in PIE. Ultimately, the dismissal of a fatigue effect is impossible and the effect of participant
fatigue remains a limitation of this study.
Future Research
The research and results of this dissertation raised many concepts for further examination.
The first area for future research was the difference between new communication content
producers and consumers. This dissertation continued the early study of new media content and
producers. While quantitative research was appropriate for many aspects of the relationship
between new communication technology and participation, it might not be the most appropriate
for examining a very new construct. Scholars are still in the beginning stages of examining the
relationship between those who primarily produce content on new media and those who primarily
consume content. This dissertation revealed differences in their levels of participation. Future
researchers need to take a step backward and examine consumers and producers from a qualitative
point of view first. In-depth interviews, focus groups, and participant observation of new media
users would all help to develop a firmer understanding of the construct and the key variables
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needed to measure the new media habits of users. After the establishment of valid and reliable
measures, quantitative research would be more appropriate to establish a causal relationship
between consumers and producers and their political engagement.
The second area of further research raised by this dissertation is the topic of functional
theory. Future research could expand upon testing of the functional theory of campaign
discourse. The theory has received little testing in laboratory experiments; further testing could
use the entire theory, including the acclaim, attack, and defend advertisement categories to test
each type of political advertising for effectiveness in motivating participation. Testing the ability
of policy- based and character-based advertisements to increase confidence would be a
significant area for future research. Policy- and character-based content revealed different levels
of PIE after exposure; however, future research should explore these content types to confirm
or refute the results of this study.
The third construct requiring further research was the construct of political engagement.
The results of this study raised the issue of the measurement of political engagement. The
significantly different results based upon the measure of political engagement support the call
by many scholars to rethink the measure of political engagement. The history and wealth of
empirical measures of presidential voting provided the historical rationale for its use;
however, the minimal commitment a presidential vote requires, plus the results of this
dissertation, raises questions about the measure. Future research should continue the
examination and evaluation of political engagement measures to bring some clarity to the murky
field of political communication.
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Conclusion
Researchers in the field of political communication disagree over the effect of new
communication technology on political participation. The focus of this dissertation study was to
examine three facets of political communication. First, on a macro level, the study was intended to
examine the relationship between new communication technologies and political participation.
Second, on a micro level, the study was designed to investigate the relationship between
interactivity and content of Web sites and their effects on political confidence. Finally, the study
focused on digital natives—those who have grown up with the Internet as a primary
communication tool and who will soon become the largest block of American voters.
The study used political information efficacy (PIE) as the primary theory to explain
whether youth vote. Using PIE as the driving theory, the results of the dissertation study
indicated a harmful relationship between political content consumption in a new media
environment and levels of confidence and likelihood of participation. The study also found
slight differences between different interactivity and content conditions and the reported levels
of confidence after exposure. These differences were not significant; further research is
needed to understand the difference between topic and interactivity of online political content
consumption and its effect on participants’ confidence in their political knowledge.
This study does not provide clear generalizable evidence of the relationship between
these three factors and political participation. The search for a causal relationship between the
interactivity of new communication technologies and the effect these technologies have on
political participation habits of digital natives seems more convoluted after this research. If
anything, this study contributed to the complexity of the field of political communication. On a
macro level, the difficulties in understanding the effects new communication technology have on
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political participation were highlighted further by the mixed results of this research. Some of the
conflicts in this relationship between the two were underscored with this study. The search for
substantial causal effects between 21st-century media consumption and political participation
continues. The call for continued research in the political communication field is supported with
the findings of this study. The questions remain: What type of political content influences political
interest and engagement, and under what conditions? Further research into these areas could help
assess whether online political content consumption has a substantial impact on engagement.
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APPENDIX A: PIE
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the study. First, we will begin with some questions
concerning your political beliefs and media use.
I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our
country.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

If a friend asked me about the upcoming election, I feel I would have enough information to
help my friend figure out who to vote for.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]
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APPENDIX B: CITIZENSHIP NORMS
I feel it is important to take action to support people who are worse off than I am.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I feel it is important to obey laws and regulations.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I feel it is important to form my own opinion on matters.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

I feel it is important to be active in volunteer organizations.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

I feel it is important to be active in politics.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

I feel it is important to serve on a jury when called.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

I feel it is important to support the military in whatever way I can.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I feel it is important to report a crime if I witness one.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]
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APPENDIX C: ONLINE POLITICAL EXPRESSION
I share political news, video clips, or others’ blog posts online.
Not at all
[]

[]

[]

[]

Very Frequently
[]

I exchange opinions about politics via e-mail, social media (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook,
LinkedIn, etc.) or other sites on the Internet.
Not at all
[]

[]

[]

Very Frequently
[]

[]

[]

Very Frequently
[]

[]

[]

Very Frequently
[]

[]

I write blog posts on political issues.
Not at all
[]

[]

I participate in online political discussions.
Not at all
[]

[]

I create and post online audio, video, animation, photos or computer artwork to express
political views.
Not at all
[]

[]

[]

[]

Very Frequently
[]
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APPENDIX D: NEW MEDIA USE

Over the past six months, how much time on a typical day do you spend
writing or creating content on the following activities on the internet:
Personal Webpage or Blogs:
15 minutes or
16–30

31–59

One to two

More than

fewer

minutes

minutes

hours.

two hours per day.

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

Facebook or other social networks:
15 minutes
or fewer

16–30
minutes

31–59
minutes

One to two
hours.

More than
two hours per day.

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

15 minutes or
fewer

16–30
minutes

31–59
minutes

One to two
hours.

More than
two hours per day.

[]

[]

[]

[]

[]

YouTube:
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APPENDIX E:
CODING OF STIMULI ACCORDING TO
FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF CAMPAIGN DISCOURSE
Political Advertisements
Policy Function:
Acclaim: “Emmer voted for reduced government spending.” - MN Forward
Character Function:
Acclaim: “I remember where I came from. I believe in opportunity, I believe in
hard work to build a good life. I believe we can fix our economy. I believe we
can get this right.”- Kyrillos for US Senate
Political News Stories
Policy Function:
Terry Whitney announces campaign for U.S. Senate
In declaring his campaign for the U.S. Senate, Terry
Whitney discussed policies that he promised would help
change the direction of this country and the State of
Michigan.
Whitney stated, "job creation and economic development
are critical to the future of Michigan. I know success in
our economy means tapping the innovation of our people
to find new approaches to attract more jobs to the state.
And those jobs need to pay a living wage — one large
enough for working people to raise a family and pay the
bills."
Whitney's campaign has focused on his record as a small
business owner and county executive. "I have proven
track record of professionalism and enterprise level
experience creating jobs, cutting costs, and thinking outside the box to deliver real world
solutions to the ever changing and complex business world," said Whitney.
In Marquette County, Whitney helped set up an economic development fund that encouraged
businesses, small and large, to bring jobs back to Michigan.
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Whitney continued, "bringing new business into Michigan is important — but we also need to
protect the jobs that are already here. Thanks to the President’s auto rescue, Detroit
manufacturing is back. We need to make sure that forward progress continues."
Whitney concluded his campaign announcement, with a focus on education. "Each step on the
educational ladder brings with it economic progress. Bringing new and innovative jobs to
Michigan will only be effective if we have the educated workforce to fill them."
As Marquette County Executive, Whitney has made investments in our children. The county
implemented a universal preschool program to make sure children get the head start they need.
"The investment in our schools and teachers will pay off in the long term, this is just an example
of the priorities I'll bring to Washington," stated Whitney.

Character Function:
John Gregg campaigns for Governor
John Gregg visited Franklin County Saturday
night when he made a campaign stop at The
Hearthstone Restaurant just outside Metamora.
He sat down for an interview before the event.
Gregg, who is from Southwestern Indiana,
served three terms as Speaker of the Indiana
House of Representatives, and he spoke to an
enthusiastic and packed room.
When asked about the economic challenges facing Indiana, Gregg was quick to reply.
“We’ve got some issues. 60 percent of our bridges in Indiana are going to need to be replaced in
the next 20 years. We have some natural things that we can take advantage of such as energy.
Clean coal, methane, natural gas, wind farms, we need to be manufacturing the poles and the
blades for those wind farms. When I was a kid, people were moving over to Connersville,
Marion, Anderson, New Castle, because of the good paying auto industry jobs. We have to get
back to that with value added and advanced manufacturing. We need to do everything we can to
make sure if something is going to be built, it is going to be built in Indiana," Gregg said.
Next, he was asked about what he would do differently in his administration?
“We can do things, we can accomplish things. We build the rails trains run on, we build the
engines at Cummings that they use, we build the boxcars in Muncie, yet we have no rail policy?
We can have common sense things but we have to stop fussing and fighting. We need the proper
leadership to fix these issues. We lack commonsense because we lack the right leaders to take
charge and cross party lines. When I was Speaker, the Republicans controlled the Senate and we
passed balanced budgets, we collaborated, we cooperated, and we worked together because the
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next generation was more important than the next election, and we need to get back to that, and I
will do that as Governor,” Gregg said.
Times seem to be tough and politics seem to be nothing but polarizing, why is that?
“There have been three major attacks from Indianapolis and from Washington D.C.; An attack
on working men and women in labor and the middle class, an attack on education, and an attack
on women through healthcare. I am pro-life, I am a minority in our party, but I am also a cancer
survivor and I know the importance of early screening. You can’t do abortions with federal
funds, and that is fine, but to want to shut down Planned Parenthood’s health care services,
breast exams, cervical exams, preventive screening, contraception, denying healthcare services to
women is wrong. We need a leader who will stand up for what he or she believes in a fight for
the people of this state," Gregg said.
The appearance by the candidate in Franklin County was the final stop after a full day of visits
and speeches across the southern part of the state and Gregg expects to keep at the same pace
throughout the election cycle.
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APPENDIX F: PIE

I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics involving these candidates.

Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I think that I am better informed about politics involving these candidates than most people are.

Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing these
candidates.

Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

If a friend asked me about the upcoming election involving these candidates, I feel I would
have enough information to help my friend figure out who to vote for.

Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]
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APPENDIX G: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
You are almost finished. We have just a few more questions. We’d now like to gather some
personal information about you. Please remember all your answer are confidential.

Are you a U.S. Citizen?

Yes
[]

No
[]

Are you male or female?

Male
[]

Female
[]

Which of the following best describes your race?

White,
nonHispanic

Black/
African
American

Hispanic

Asian or
Pacific
Islander

[]

[]

[]

[]

American
South
Indian or
Asian/Middle
Alaskan Native
Eastern

[]

How old were you on your last birthday’? fill in the blank)

[]

Other

[]
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APPENDIX H: VOTING BEHAVIOR

I always make an effort to vote.

Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I have voted in all local elections which have occurred, since I have been eligible to vote.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]

I have voted in all state elections, which have occurred, since I have been eligible to vote.
Strongly Disagree
[]

[]

Did you vote in the 2012 Presidential election?

Yes
[]

No
[]

[]

[]

Strongly Agree
[]
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The health of the American democracy is up for debate. Digital natives will decide the
future of this democracy. Fewer digital natives—those who have grown up with Internet
access—are engaging in formal political participation, compared to their parents. Digital natives
lack the information needed to participate. This study examined the effects of interactive
political content on digital natives’ political information efficacy (PIE) through an experiment.
The results revealed a decrease in the participants’ political confidence and a decrease in the
likelihood they would vote. Exposure to political information harmed most digital natives’ PIE
and reinforced political attitudes in some. The results are troubling for the future health of the
American democracy. The results call attention to the need for further research on the
relationship between digital natives’ use of new communication technologies and its effect on
political participation.
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